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SUMMARY 
The Korean labour market has created many jobs over the past several decades, accompanying rapid 
economic growth. More recently, this favourable job performance has gone hand-in-hand with a rapid 
increase of temporary employment and other flexible or atypical work arrangements (usually called 
“non-regular” work in Korea). This trend has raised much concern in Korean society about the risk of 
persistent labour market duality and the various downsides associated with such a development. 
Temporary employment increased from 17% of total wage and salary employment in 2001 to 29% in 
2006 – the fastest rate of increase among OECD countries in recent years. Women are overrepresented in 
temporary employment. In contrast to most other OECD countries, the incidence of temporary employment 
is not much higher among youths than it is among prime-age workers, but it rises sharply for older workers 
– a feature related to companies’ mandatory retirement practices. Less-educated workers and small 
enterprises have high levels of temporary work. 
Surveys report substantial wage gaps and large differences in access to non-wage benefits between 
“regular” and “non-regular” workers. The available research suggests – despite some variation in findings, 
depending on data sources and definition – that a considerable proportion of non-regular workers may be 
trapped in this type of job. It also suggests that hiring and human resource management practices by Korean 
firms, aiming to circumvent relatively strict employment protection legislation (EPL) for permanent workers 
and to profit from labour-cost differentials between different categories of worker, have been the main causes 
of the growth in temporary employment. 
The Korean government has already introduced a number of relevant measures and policy proposals, 
ranging from anti-discrimination legislation to revisions of EPL and the expansion of the social safety-net. 
These measures have been rather fragmented, however, resulting in few synergy effects. Some reform 
measures – such as the recent legislation to reverse the trend towards temporary employment – have met 
with strong objections from trade unions and/or business groups, taking a considerable time before being 
passed by the National Assembly. 
Continuing reform of EPL, so as to achieve greater balance in the treatment of regular versus 
non-regular forms of employment, is essential for combating labour market duality. Strict EPL for regular 
contracts should be eased, thus making the hiring of permanent workers more attractive, while non-regular 
workers are protected from overt discrimination in terms of pay and access to other benefits. Greater 
efforts should be made to convert the existing type of severance pay (which takes the form of a retirement 
allowance) to a corporate pension scheme, and to extend it to employees with less than one year of tenure. 
Further measures should include encouraging firms to raise their company-specific mandatory retirement 
ages towards the official retirement age; and promoting equal access to continuing training for non-regular 
employees. In addition, the public employment service (PES) needs to ensure better access of temporary 
and other non-regular workers to its services. 
 Finally, atypical employment can be reduced by promoting further transition towards a salaried 
economy, ensuring that all employers report wages and salaries correctly, including those for short-term 
workers, and pay the necessary social insurance contributions. For this purpose, co-operation between 
social insurance administrations and the tax authority is desirable. The PES also has a role in promoting the 
conversion of undeclared work into legally declared jobs. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Dans la foulée d’une croissance économique rapide, le marché du travail coréen a, depuis quelques 
décennies, créé de nombreux emplois. Mais récemment, cette évolution positive de l’emploi s’est 
accompagnée d’un développement rapide des emplois temporaires et autres types d’emplois flexibles ou 
atypiques (généralement dénommés en Corée emplois « non réguliers »). Cela a suscité dans la société 
coréenne beaucoup d’inquiétude quant à la persistance d’un marché du travail à deux vitesses et aux divers 
inconvénients que cela comporte. 
L’emploi temporaire est passé de 17% du total de l’emploi salarié en 2001 à 29% en 2006 – c’est le 
rythme de croissance le plus rapide des pays de l’OCDE ces dernières années. Les femmes sont 
surreprésentées dans ce type d’emplois. Contrairement à ce qui se passe dans la plupart des autres pays de 
l’OCDE, son incidence n’est pas beaucoup plus élevée chez les jeunes que chez les travailleurs d’âge très 
actif – mais elle augmente fortement chez les travailleurs âgés, du fait des pratiques de retraite obligatoire 
en vigueur dans les entreprises. Les taux d’emplois temporaires sont par ailleurs élevés parmi les 
travailleurs peu instruits et dans les petites entreprises. 
Les enquêtes font apparaître entre les travailleurs « réguliers » et « non réguliers » d’importantes 
disparités de salaires et d’accès aux prestations non salariales. Les études semblent indiquer – même si les 
conclusions varient quelque peu en fonction des sources et des définitions de données – qu’une proportion 
considérable de travailleurs non réguliers peuvent se trouver piégés dans ce type d’emploi. Elles montrent 
aussi que les pratiques de recrutement et de gestion des ressources humaines utilisées par les entreprises 
coréennes afin de contourner une législation de protection de l’emploi qui est relativement stricte pour les 
travailleurs permanents et de tirer profit des différentiels de coûts de main-d’œuvre entre différentes 
catégories de travailleurs ont été les principales causes du développement des emplois temporaires. 
Le gouvernement coréen a déjà mis au point un certain nombre de mesures et de propositions qui vont 
d’une législation anti-discrimination à des révisions des lois de protection de l’emploi et à l’élargissement 
du filet de sécurité sociale. Cependant ces mesures sont assez fragmentées, de sorte qu’il y a peu d’effets 
de synergie. Certaines réformes telles que la récente loi visant à inverser la tendance à la multiplication des 
emplois temporaires ont rencontré de la part des syndicats et/ou des entreprises de vives objections, et il a 
fallu du temps avant qu’elles soient votées à l’Assemblée nationale. 
Il est indispensable de poursuivre la réforme de la législation de protection de l’emploi afin de mieux 
équilibrer le traitement des emplois réguliers et non réguliers si l’on veut lutter contre la dualité du marché du 
travail. Il y a lieu d’assouplir la protection de l’emploi pour les contrats réguliers, afin de faciliter le recrutement 
de travailleurs permanents, tout en protégeant les travailleurs non réguliers contre une discrimination flagrante 
en termes de salaire et d’accès aux prestations. Davantage d’efforts doivent être faits pour convertir l’indemnité 
de départ actuelle (allocation de retraite) en régime de pension d’entreprise, et l’étendre aux salariés qui ont 
moins d’un an d’ancienneté. Il y aura lieu en outre d’encourager les entreprises à rapprocher l’âge de retraite 
obligatoire qui leur est propre de l’âge officiel de la retraite, et d’encourager l’égalité d’accès à la formation 
continue pour les salariés non réguliers. En outre, le service public de l’emploi (SPE) doit offrir un meilleur 
accès à ses services pour les travailleurs temporaires et autres travailleurs non réguliers. 
Enfin, on peut réduire l’emploi atypique en encourageant le développement de l’économie salariée, de 
façon que tous les employeurs déclarent correctement les salaires, y compris ceux des travailleurs 
temporaires, et paient leurs cotisations d’assurance sociale. Ceci suppose une coopération entre 
l’administration de l’assurance sociale et les services fiscaux. Le SPE a lui aussi un rôle à jouer pour 
encourager la conversion du travail non déclaré en travail légalement déclaré. 
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ADDRESSING LABOUR MARKET DUALITY IN KOREA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1. The Korean labour market has created many jobs over the past several decades, accompanying 
rapid economic growth. Even after the financial crisis of 1997/98, which led to a sharp hike in the 
unemployment rate, the recovery of employment was rapid and strong. However, the recovery went 
hand-in-hand with a rapid increase of non-regular or atypical forms of employment. This trend has raised 
much concern in Korean society about the risk of persistent labour market duality or segmentation. 
2. Although the term non-regular workers is widely used in Korean economic literature, among 
policy makers and in the media, a full consensus on the definition is lacking, as different data sets are 
collected and published via different surveys. Elements of the definition may include the temporary nature 
of employment, part-time work, and the lack of entitlement to bonus pay and various employer allowances. 
The various uses of the term in Korea are discussed in the Annex, and the report itself presents data using 
these variable definitions. For purposes of international comparison, it also tries to distinguish the 
temporary element separately. 
3. Temporary employment and other flexible or atypical work arrangements may have beneficial as 
well as adverse effects. They may increase employment levels by enhancing employment flexibility for 
enterprises, and some workers may even prefer temporary work because it permits them to combine work 
with other activities. Temporary jobs often also serve as a first step towards permanent jobs. However, they 
may also imply considerable employment and income insecurity, or even the risk of alternating between 
short-term jobs and unemployment or inactivity. Further, growth of temporary employment may lead to 
reduced investment by firms in their workers’ human capital and widen wage and income dispersion. 
4. The purpose of this report is to i) shed light on the causes of the high incidence of non-regular 
employment in Korea, and ii) examine how policy reforms may help reduce labour market duality while 
also supporting employment growth. The report is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the extent of 
duality in the Korean labour market and presents trends in the incidence of non-regular employment and in 
employment conditions and career dynamics of temporary workers, with a focus on how the Korean labour 
market compares with other OECD countries. Section 3 identifies the main institutional features of labour 
market policy in Korea, which impact on the incidence of non-regular employment, including 
labour-management relations and wage determination practices. Section 4 explores a range of policies to 
address labour market duality, including more uniform treatment of regular and non-regular workers in a 
number of policy areas. The final section presents a number of policy recommendations. 
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2. LABOUR MARKET DUALITY IN KOREA 
2.1. The recent labour market situation 
5. The Korean economy recovered very quickly from the 1997/98 financial crisis and the 
subsequent economic recession. GDP grew by almost 10% per annum in 1999 and 2000. In 2003, 
however, due to weak domestic consumption and lower economic growth rates worldwide, the economy 
went into a slowdown, accompanied by relatively sluggish labour market performance. At the same time, 
concern about jobless growth emerged, since employment declined in 2003 for the first time after recovery 
from the financial crisis (Table 2.1). This led to the agreement on a Social Pact for Job Creation in the 
Tripartite Commission in early 2004. After 2003, employment has grown again, particularly among 
women, but at a relatively modest rate. By 2006, the employment rate among the population aged 15-64 
had fully recovered to its pre-crisis level (although it is still much below OECD average).
1
 
6. The unemployment rate has declined continuously from its peak of over 7% during the financial 
crisis, but the rate remains at around 3.5%, one percentage point above its level in 1997.
2
 The brunt of slow 
job creation has fallen on youths and young adults (aged 15-24), whose unemployment rate increased from 
8.5% in 2002 to 10% in 2006, three times the rate for prime-age adults. In contrast to practically all other 
OECD countries, unemployment continues to be lower among the lesser-educated. The incidence of 
long-term unemployment, defined as unemployment of over 12 months duration, is still quite insignificant 
(around 1% of total unemployment). However, a large number of young graduates drop out of the labour 
market altogether after leaving school and become inactive for a considerable length of time (OECD, 
2007a); also, the Korea Labor Institute (KLI) recently found that the rate of transition from unemployment 
to out-of-the labour force status has doubled since the mid-1990s (Nam et al., 2005a).
3
 
7. Figure 2.1 shows long-term trends in employment growth since the early 1970s. These data seem 
to confirm the analysis in the Social Pact for Job Creation to the effect that the Korean economy’s ability 
to create additional jobs has been falling (OECD, 2004a). Manufacturing industry has not created any 
employment over four of the last five years, due to increased productivity resulting from technological and 
structural changes and a shift from labour-intensive to capital-intensive production. In this context, the 
Korean government has begun to shift the main focus of its employment policy from fighting 
unemployment to fostering employment growth. 
                                                          
1. The employment rate (employment/population ratio) of the working-age population (15-64) increased from 
a little over 60% in 1998 to 64% in 2005, identical to the 1997 value, while the rate for age 15 and above 
remains a little below that level. Reflecting low employment rates of women and youth, the overall 
employment rate in Korea remains much below the OECD average. For example, in 2005, while the rate 
for males was about the OECD average, the rate for women was almost 4 percentage points and that of 
youth (15-24) about 13 percentage points below OECD averages. 
2. The definition of survey unemployment was recently brought in line with that used by the OECD and the 
ILO, by changing the reference period for job search from one week to four weeks. 
3. In contrast to the extremely low incidence of long-term unemployment in Korea, in 2006 the average 
incidence for OECD countries was 32%, and almost 45% for OECD Europe. 
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Table 2.1. Trends in GDP, employment and unemployment in Korea, 1997-2006 
Percentages 
Panel A. Annual growth rates 
 1997 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 
GDP (at constant prices) 4.7 8.5 3.1 4.7 4.2 5.0 
Labour force (population aged 15-64) 2.1 1.9 0.2 1.6 1.0 0.7 
Employment (population aged 15-64) 1.4 4.0 -0.1 1.5 0.9 1.0 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing -1.6 -2.6 -5.8 -6.4 -0.5 -1.7 
Mining and manufacturing -3.9 6.5 -0.9 2.0 -1.3 -1.6 
Construction 2.2 7.3 4.0 0.2 -0.3 1.2 
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels 3.2 4.0 -2.4 0.2 -1.0 -0.8 
Electricity, transport, storage/telecom and finance 4.2 3.8 0.1 1.3 2.7 3.9 
Business, personal, public services and others 6.6 5.2 3.4 6.8 5.6 4.7 
Memorandum item: 
Employment OECD (population aged 15-64) 1.6 1.5 0.5 1.3 1.3 1.7 
Panel B. Employment/population ratios 
 1997 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total (population aged 15-64) 63.7 61.5 63.0 63.6 63.7 63.8 
Men 76.2 73.1 75.0 75.2 75.0 74.6 
Women 51.6 50.0 51.1 52.2 52.5 53.1 
Total (population aged 15 and over) 60.9 58.5 59.3 59.8 59.7 59.7 
Memorandum item: 
Total OECD (population aged 15-64) 65.0 65.6 64.8 65.1 65.5 66.1 
Panel C. Unemployment rates 
 1997 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total 2.6 4.4 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.4 
Men 2.8 5.0 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.8 
Women 2.3 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.4 2.9 
Memorandum item: 
Total OECD 7.0 6.2 7.0 6.9 6.6 6.1 
| Break in series: from 2000, data are based on the new Korean Standard Industry Classification. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database for economic growth; OECD Labour Force Statistics database; National Statistical 
Office (NSO), Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS), 2004; and KNSO Website for 2006 data. 
8. The impact of the economic slowdown since 2003 has varied across industrial sectors. Apart 
from Agriculture, forestry and fishing, whose share has been declining consistently over the past few 
decades, the category Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels has been most adversely affected, 
due mainly to weak domestic consumption (Table 2.1). By contrast, employment growth has been strong in 
business and personal services, as well as the public sector. The composition of the workforce by 
employment status has also been much affected throughout the post-crisis decade. The share of non-wage 
workers (i.e. the self-employed and unpaid family members) declined by 4 percentage points during the 
past decade – a phenomenon closely related to the decline of employment in the trade, restaurants and 
hotels sector. Nevertheless, the incidence of self-employment (together with family workers) remains 
almost twice the OECD average and is one of the highest in the OECD area, along with Turkey, Greece 
and Mexico. In Korea, the transition to a salaried economy is far from being complete (Table 2.2). 
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Figure 2.1. Employment growth in Korea, 1973-2006 
Percentages 
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Source: OECD (2006), Labour Force Statistics, 1985-2005, Paris; and NSO website for 2006 data. 
Table 2.2. Composition of employment by worker status in Korea, 1997-2006 
Percentages 
 1997 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Non-wage earners 36.8 36.8 34.9 34.0 33.6 32.8 
Self-employed 27.8 27.7 27.3 27.1 27.0 26.5 
Unpaid family members 9.0 9.1 7.7 6.9 6.6 6.3 
Wage and salary earners
a
 63.2 63.1 65.1 66.0 66.4 67.2 
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
Regular employees 34.3 30.2 32.8 33.8 34.6 35.4 
(54.3) (47.9) (50.5) (51.2) (52.1) (52.8) 
Temporary employees 20.0 21.8 22.6 22.5 22.1 22.2 
(31.6) (34.5) (34.7) (34.1) (33.3) (33.1) 
Daily workers 8.9 11.1 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.5 
(14.1) (17.6) (14.8) (14.7) (14.6) (14.2) 
Memorandum item: 
Wage and salary earners, OECD average 81.0 82.2 82.5 82.5 82.9 .. 
.. Data not available. 
a) The definition of regular and temporary employees and daily workers is from the Economically Active Population Survey. 
Source: NSO, Economically Active Population Survey; and OECD (2006), Labour Force Statistics, 1985-2005, Paris. 
9. As to the age composition of employment, available data show that the share of youth (both 15-24 and 
15-29) in employment has been gradually shrinking, while that for older workers (50+) has substantially 
increased since the latter half of the 1990s, although the employment rate for older workers actually declined 
 DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2007)16 
 15 
(Table 2.3). This implies that the Korean labour force is ageing rapidly; in fact, Korea is the fastest-ageing 
society in the OECD.
4
 The employment rate for older workers in Korea is still relatively high (in the upper third 
of OECD countries for the age group 50-64, and among the highest of all countries in the age group 65-74). 
Nevertheless, in conjunction with the seniority-based wage structure, mandatory retirement at a relatively low 
age remains a common practice among Korean firms. According to survey results from mid-size and large 
firms, the most common mandatory retirement age is 55, while the average age is somewhat higher at about 
57 years (OECD, 2004b). Although some of the employees leaving companies fully withdraw from the labour 
market, about three-quarters of them move into self-employment. Among those older workers continuing to 
work as dependent employees, roughly two-thirds are working as non-regular employees (temporary and daily 
workers), as defined in the labour force survey (the Economically Active Population Survey, EAPS) (OECD, 
2004b and 2005a).
5
 
Table 2.3. Employment trends by age group, 1997-2006 
Percentages 
 1997 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Persons aged 15-29 (15-24) 
Share in total employment 25.2 (11.2) 23.1 (9.7) 20.8 (9.1) 20.3 (8.8) 19.5 (8.0) 18.4 (7.0) 
Employment growth -1.3  4.0  -4.0  -0.6  -2.8  -4.0  
Persons aged 30-49 
Share in total employment 52.4 54.0 55.2 54.9 54.4 54.2 
Employment growth 2.3 4.6 1.2 1.4 0.3 0.9 
Persons aged 50 and over 
Share in total employment 22.4 23.0 24.0 24.8 26.2 27.4 
Employment growth 4.0 3.6 0.3 5.2 6.9 6.0 
Employment/population ratio 
Persons aged 15-29 (15-24) 45.6 (32.2) 43.4 (29.4) 44.4 (30.8) 45.1 (31.2) 44.9 (29.9) 43.4 (27.2) 
Persons aged 50 and over 54.7 50.8 50.1 50.7 50.9 51.6 
Memorandum item: 
OECD average E/P ratios 
Persons aged 15-29 (15-24) 54.7 (45.0) 55.4 (45.6) 52.8 (42.7) 53.1 (42.9) 53.3 (42.9) 54.0 (43.3) 
Persons aged 50 and over 35.9 36.8 37.5 37.7 38.3 38.8 
.. Data not available. 
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics database. 
10. One of the more significant trends in the Korean labour market since the financial crisis is the 
increase in job precariousness, in particular those jobs that do not offer workers the prospect of a 
longer-lasting employment relationship. Although a survey tool to measure the extent of precarious 
employment in Korea was not developed until 2000, labour market duality became a controversial issue in 
Korea on the basis of labour force survey data published by the National Statistical Office which showed that 
the share of non-regular workers among all wage and salary earners increased to over 50% following the 
financial crisis (Table 2.2).
6
 Considering that the EAPS was not designed to measure precarious jobs and that 
                                                          
4. The OECD’s report on Ageing and Employment Policies: Korea has confirmed that Korea will have one of 
the oldest populations and highest old-age dependency ratios in the OECD by the year 2040. The share of 
workers aged 50 and over in the total labour force is projected to double from 23% in 2000 to over 45% in 
2040, while the share of young workers aged 15-24 is expected to decline to below 6% (OECD, 2004b). 
5. This refers to the category of non-regular workers under the Economically Active Population Survey, not 
to the category of temporary workers as defined later on in this paper (see Section 2.2 below and the 
discussion of statistical definitions in the Annex). 
6. The EAPS has collected data on employment status since 1989, categorising dependent employees as 
regular employees, temporary employees and daily workers. Regular employees are defined as those who 
i) work more than one year at a firm, thus benefiting from the retirement allowance, and ii) are paid 
standard wages, plus bonuses and overtime. All other employees are defined as non-regular and divided 
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it seemed to considerably overestimate their extent, the Korean government began to implement an annual 
EAPS supplement to better measure various “non–standard” employment categories starting from the autumn 
of 2000. 
2.2. Temporary employment 
A. Definition of temporary employment 
11. Although various non-traditional employment patterns, in particular short-term and temporary 
work, have been spreading throughout OECD member countries over the past several decades, there is no 
commonly accepted definition which could represent these new arrangements. Terms such as atypical, 
casual, non-standard or non-permanent forms of employment – including the Korean and Japanese variant 
of non-regular employment – have been much in use. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics, for example, has 
since 1995 periodically collected data on contingent workers and alternative work arrangements, where 
contingent workers are defined as those who do not perceive themselves as having an explicit and implicit 
contract for ongoing employment, and alternative work arrangements are defined as employment arranged 
through intermediaries or for which the place, time and quantity of work are potentially unpredictable 
(Hipple, 2001; Murtough and Waite, 2000; Ahn, 2004). To take another example, researchers at the Italian 
Statistical Institute (ISTAT) have developed a new classification of atypical employment arrangements, 
based on three main dimensions: i) the stability of the work relationship (permanent vs. temporary jobs); 
ii) the length of the working-time regime (full-time vs. reduced time regimes); and iii) the extent of 
workers’ entitlements to social rights associated with the working arrangement (Tronti et al., 2004). 
12. To allow better international comparisons, the OECD maintains a database on temporary 
employment. Under the OECD definition – as well as Eurostat guidelines – temporary jobs are those forms of 
dependent employment which, by their nature, do not provide the prospect of a long-lasting employment 
relationship. The definition includes employees under fixed-term contracts, seasonal workers, temporary 
agency jobs, and those with a training contract of limited duration. While in many cases the temporary nature 
of a job is evident – for example, when there is a written contract specifying that the job lasts a specific 
amount of time – other cases are less clear-cut and the characteristics of employment arrangements that might 
be considered temporary can differ across institutional legal and policy settings. As a result, caution is 
required in international comparisons of the incidence of temporary employment (OECD, 1996 and 2002; 
and EIRO, 2002).
7
 
13. In Korea, the term non-regular workers is widely used, although there is disagreement among 
scholars on its definition and measurement. The Annex outlines several definitions currently in use, the 
most important of which are those from the regular labour force survey (EAPS) and the supplementary 
labour force survey that was designed to throw more light on the issue of labour market duality or 
precariousness. The present report relies mainly on the OECD/Eurostat definition of temporary 
employment as outlined above, which allows a degree of international comparison and can provide a solid 
framework for analysis of labour market duality. The definition used in the supplementary labour force 
                                                                                                                                                                             
into temporary employees and daily workers by the length of their respective employment relationships. 
This non-regular workforce was measured as 45% of dependent employment in 1989, declining steadily to 
41% by 1993. The share then rose significantly after 1997 to over 52% in 2000. This figure overestimates 
the extent of precariousness of employment, since many employees in SMEs, who are not entitled to the 
retirement allowance and do not receive bonus payments, are likely to be included, although they are in 
fairly stable jobs. 
7. It should also be noted that countries with a high incidence of temporary or fixed-term employment (as 
reported by employees based on their contract or expected job tenure) may nevertheless have high labour 
turnover (measured for example by the incidence of employment with less than one year’s job tenure). 
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survey is closest to, but not identical with, the OECD’s definition. Among the various categories used in 
the supplementary survey, this report classifies the following as “temporary workers”: workers under 
fixed-term contracts, those who do not expect their jobs to last for involuntary and non-economic reasons, 
temporary agency workers and on-call workers. However, it excludes permanent part-time workers and 
categories (such as contractors) that would normally be classified as self-employed.
8
 This definition has 
also been used in recent OECD Economic Surveys of Korea (OECD, 2004a and 2005a) (see the Annex for 
more detail). 
B. Trends in the incidence of temporary employment 
14. Table 2.4 shows the share of temporary employment in total dependent employment in Korea 
since the summer of 2001, when the supplement to the EAPS started to collect data on specific types of 
employment.
9
 According to this survey, the share of temporary employment stood at 28.8% in 2006, 
almost twice the 2001 share, but a bit below the 2004 and 2005 levels. The largest subcategory is workers 
with a fixed-term contract (in most cases with a duration of one year or less), followed by workers without 
such a contract who for involuntary reasons do not expect their employment to continue.
10
 
Table 2.4. Share of temporary workers in Korea, 2001-06 
Percentages 
 2001 2002 2003
a
 2004
a
 2005
a
 2006
a
 
Workers 
with a 
fixed-term 
contract 
Less than or equal to 1 month 5.6 5.2 6.7 5.6 5.5 5.2 
More than 1 month to less than 1 year 2.8 2.7 4.9 4.7 4.8 4.9 
Exactly 1 year 1.5 1.9 3.3 4.4 5.3 5.0 
More than 1 year to less than 3 years 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 
3 years or more 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Subtotal 11.0 10.9 17.0 17.1 18.2 17.7 
Workers without a fixed-term contract, where employment 
is not expected to continue due to involuntary reasons 
2.9 
 
3.8 
(1.8)
b
 
4.3 
(2.6)
b
 
7.6 
(3.6)
b
 
5.9 
(3.9)
b
 
5.9 
.. 
Temporary agency workers 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 
On-call workers 2.2 2.9 4.2 4.6 4.8 4.3 
Total
c
 16.6 18.1 25.9 29.7 29.4 28.8 
Memorandum item 
Total dependent employment (000s) 13 659 14 181 14 402 14 894 15 185 15 531 
.. Data not available. 
a) There have been several changes in the survey from 2003 on requiring caution in interpreting trends. The entire sample of 
households for the Economically Active Population Survey was replaced in January 2003, and the question structure in the 
supplementary survey was partially modified. 
b) Since 2002 the category Workers without a fixed-term contract, where employment is not expected to continue due to involuntary 
reasons includes a subcategory of workers whose contract is being renewed on a regular basis, but who assess the durability of 
their employment to be limited. The figures in parenthesis exclude this subcategory. 
c) Total is adjusted for overlapping categories. 
Source: EAPS Supplement, various years, as reported by the Korean Ministry of Labor; and OECD Labour Force Statistics database. 
                                                          
8. Temporary workers represent about 80% of non-regular workers, as identified in the supplementary survey. 
9. The survey was first implemented in 2000, but the survey questions were redesigned in 2001. 
10. The sum of these two categories is defined as the contingent workforce by the Korean Ministry of Labor. 
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2007)16 
 18 
Figure 2.2. Incidence of temporary employment in OECD countries, in the mid-1980s, mid-1990s 
and 2005 
Percentages 
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a) Unweighted average of countries and years shown. 
Source: OECD Temporary Employment database; and EAPS Supplement, August 2005, for Korea. 
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15. Figure 2.2, based on the OECD’s annual comparative data set on temporary employment, shows 
that the Korean share of temporary employees in total dependent employment is second only to Spain’s, 
where it is around one-third. It also highlights considerable diversity across OECD countries. In 2005, this 
share was below 5% in Ireland, the United States and the Slovak Republic, and was above 20% in Korea, 
Mexico, Poland and Spain. The (unweighted) average incidence of temporary employment in 2005 was 
12.8% both in the OECD and in the European Union (EU-15). 
16. The OECD database provides ample material for studying the evolution of temporary 
employment and its subcomponents over the past two decades. On average, temporary employment has 
increased steadily in OECD countries, from about 10% in the mid-1980s to almost 13% in 2005. However, 
the trends remain diverse. From the mid-1990s to 2005, temporary employment increased in 15 of the 
27 countries for which full data are available, and declined in 12 of them. The temporary workforce 
increased most significantly in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal, while it declined markedly in 
Iceland, Ireland, Norway and Turkey. It also declined somewhat in Spain (the country with the highest 
level of temporary employment). Overall, the trend towards a high level of temporary employment in the 
OECD area is thus not as universal and clear-cut as is sometimes alleged. For example, the increase in the 
OECD average between 1995 and 2005 would have been much less, if it had not been for the addition of 
Poland and Korea to the database, where the share is over 20%. 
17. When analysing the relationship between changes in the incidence of temporary employment and 
changes in unemployment and employment rates in OECD countries over the past decade, no systematic 
link can be established (Figure 2.3). However, in Ireland and Spain large increases in employment and 
declines in unemployment were associated with decreasing temporary-worker shares in the workforce. 
18. The OECD dataset indicates that Korea is the OECD country where the temporary workforce has 
increased the most rapidly in recent years – from a share of 16.6% in the 2001 survey to 29.7% (i.e. almost 
twice the initial value) in the 2004 survey and 28.8% in 2006. This may suggest that many previously 
permanent positions have been transformed into fixed-term employment relationships. However, there are 
several caveats to the data shown in Table 2.4. First, the incidence of “workers with a fixed-term contract” 
increased by over 6 percentage points between the 2002 and 2003 surveys, raising an issue of data 
consistency. Part of this increase may be explained by significant changes in the household sample between 
2002 and 2003. Also, written contracts are still not universal in Korea. This poses measurement problems, 
since it is often not apparent whether the duration of a contract is limited or not. The steady increase 
between 2001 and 2004 in the category Workers without a fixed-term contract, where employment is not 
expected to continue due to involuntary reasons may therefore reflect changes in the subjective assessment 
of employment duration based, for example, on perceptions of security or insecurity against the background 
of the business cycle. While the increase in the temporary workforce has certainly been significant, it is not 
clear that the number of temporary workers really increased to the extent shown by the survey. 
19. Based on the supplementary survey, the number of on-call workers in Korea seems also to have 
increased considerably since 2001 (no comparable data are available from other OECD countries). By 
contrast, the incidence of temporary agency workers has not changed much, and remains below 1% of all 
wage and salary earners (corresponding to 0.6% of total employment). Due mainly to the continuing 
restrictions on the number of industrial sectors and occupations where temporary agency work is allowed, 
the Korean level is relatively low compared to levels in either the United States or 
European Union countries. According to the latest European survey, temporary agency workers were 1% 
to 2% of total employment in most of the EU-15 countries, with levels above 2% in Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. At the other extreme, temporary agency work in Greece and 
Denmark (at 0.3% each) was less developed than in Korea (Arrowsmith, 2006). 
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Figure 2.3. Changes in the incidence of temporary employment  
and employment/unemployment rates, 1995-2005
a
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a) 1998-2004 for Australia; 1997-2005 for Canada, Finland, Hungary and Sweden; 1998-2005 for the Czech Republic; 1995-2002 
for Iceland; 1996-2005 for Luxembourg and Norway; and 1995-2004 for Mexico. 
Source: OECD Temporary Employment database; OECD (2006), Labour Force Statistics, 1985-2005, Paris, for 
employment/population ratios and unemployment rates, with the exception of national figures for Hungary, Norway and Switzerland. 
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C. Composition of temporary employment 
Composition by age, gender and educational attainment 
20. Table 2.5 shows the incidence of temporary employment by gender and age in OECD countries. In 
Korea, 27% of male and 33% of female employment was temporary in 2005. With a few exceptions 
(particularly Mexico, Poland and Turkey), this overrepresentation of women arises in most other 
OECD countries. Often, the higher incidence among women makes up for their lower employment rate, so that 
they constitute on average almost half of all temporary employees. In Belgium, Italy and Japan, they even 
represented 60% or more of the total in 2004. By contrast, in Korea, reflecting the particularly low employment 
rate of females, their share in total temporary employment was 46% in 2005 (Ministry of Labor, 2006). 
Table 2.5. Incidence of temporary employment by gender and age in selected OECD countries, 2005
a
 
Percentages of dependent employment 
 
Men Women Total 
15-24 25-54 55+ Total 15-24 25-54 55+ Total 15-24 25-54 55+ Total 
Australia .. .. .. 5.0 .. .. .. 6.1 .. .. .. 5.5 
Austria 38.9 4.1 3.9 9.4 30.0 5.0 3.3 8.8 34.7 4.6 3.7 9.1 
Belgium 26.7 5.0 3.4 6.7 32.8 9.8 10.1 12.0 29.6 7.2 5.8 9.1 
Canada 29.4 8.6 11.7 12.5 30.3 10.1 11.6 13.9 29.9 9.3 11.7 13.2 
Czech Republic 17.1 5.3 13.3 7.6 20.0 6.8 24.8 9.8 18.3 6.0 17.7 8.6 
Denmark 32.9 4.7 4.6 8.9 25.2 9.4 5.9 11.0 29.4 7.0 5.2 9.9 
Finland 41.4 9.8 6.4 13.0 46.8 18.5 7.1 20.1 44.2 14.2 6.8 16.6 
France 46.5 7.8 4.4 11.6 46.4 10.6 5.6 13.3 46.5 9.1 5.0 12.4 
Germany 60.4 8.2 5.0 14.0 53.2 8.6 3.6 13.6 57.0 8.4 4.4 13.8 
Greece 26.2 8.9 7.6 10.2 28.9 13.3 13.8 14.7 27.3 10.7 9.3 12.1 
Hungary 18.2 6.7 5.8 7.6 15.9 5.8 4.5 6.4 17.2 6.3 5.2 7.0 
Iceland 22.8 6.3 7.7 9.5 20.2 7.9 6.1 9.7 21.5 7.1 6.8 9.6 
Ireland 6.6 1.3 2.5 2.4 7.2 1.7 2.5 2.7 6.9 1.5 2.5 2.5 
Italy 34.9 8.5 7.0 10.6 39.1 13.4 6.3 14.8 36.5 10.6 6.7 12.4 
Japan 27.1 4.1 13.0 8.2 28.7 20.4 24.8 22.3 27.9 10.8 17.4 14.0 
Korea .. .. .. 27.1 .. .. .. 32.5 36.1 26.2 46.1 29.4 
Luxembourg 31.8 3.1 0.0 4.9 25.7 4.3 3.6 5.8 29.2 3.6 1.4 5.3 
Mexico 31.4 22.2 26.8 24.9 17.2 10.3 7.7 11.9 26.4 17.9 21.9 20.3 
Netherlands 41.3 9.1 6.0 13.8 41.2 11.6 8.4 16.7 41.3 10.3 6.9 15.2 
Norway 26.0 5.5 2.6 7.5 29.7 10.3 3.9 11.6 27.8 7.8 3.2 9.5 
Poland 63.4 23.4 18.4 26.5 70.3 20.8 15.4 24.7 66.5 22.2 17.3 25.7 
Portugal 44.2 15.9 8.9 18.7 45.6 18.0 10.6 20.3 44.8 16.9 9.7 19.5 
Slovak Republic 14.1 3.7 6.5 5.1 11.1 3.2 22.7 4.9 12.8 3.4 11.3 5.0 
Spain 66.3 29.0 13.1 31.6 63.9 33.0 16.2 35.5 65.3 30.7 14.2 33.3 
Sweden 47.9 10.7 6.8 13.9 62.5 13.9 6.2 17.6 55.3 12.3 6.5 15.8 
Switzerland 51.7 6.2 10.7 12.8 47.1 6.9 8.1 13.2 49.4 6.5 9.5 13.0 
Turkey 16.5 12.5 22.1 13.5 10.4 13.2 40.6 12.7 14.6 12.7 24.2 13.3 
United Kingdom 11.3 3.6 6.3 5.2 10.8 4.8 6.0 5.9 11.1 4.2 6.1 5.5 
United States 8.5 3.5 3.5 4.2 7.6 3.4 4.4 4.2 8.1 3.5 3.9 4.2 
OECD Europe
b
 34.2 8.7 7.5 11.5 34.1 10.9 10.2 13.3 34.2 9.7 8.2 12.4 
Total OECD
b
 32.7 8.8 8.4 12.0 32.1 10.9 10.5 13.7 32.7 10.4 10.4 12.8 
.. Data are not available for this specific age groups breakdown. 
a) Data refer to 2003 for Germany and Luxembourg, 2002 for Iceland and 2001 for the United States. 
b) Unweighted average of countries and years shown. 
Source: OECD Temporary Employment database; EAPS Supplement, August 2005, for Korea. 
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21. Although temporary work is more often than not involuntary, some women may prefer temporary 
employment due to its association with flexible scheduling. Indeed, with few exceptions, temporary 
workers in OECD countries are more likely to work in part-time jobs than permanent workers. In 2000, in 
10 OECD countries over one-third of temporary workers, and in two countries (the Netherlands and 
Ireland) over half of them, worked part-time schedules (see OECD, 2002). The incidence of part-time jobs 
for temporary workers in Korea is significantly lower: in 2005, 14.0% of temporary workers and 4.1% of 
permanent workers worked part-time. This suggests that in Korea the employment of women in temporary 
jobs is less related to the need to secure working-time flexibility. 
22. As Table 2.6 on the incidence of non-regular work suggests, in Korea, many female workers who 
left the labour market for marriage and/or child-birth have difficulty finding permanent employment and 
need to take up temporary jobs when they return to the labour market. When analysing data collected by the 
EAPS Supplement, Jeong (2005) found that the incidence of non-regular work for females increases beyond 
the age of 30.
11
 By contrast, the incidence of non-regular work for males only increases after age 40. This 
positive correlation of temporary employment among women after the age of 30 was confirmed in an 
analysis by Jeong (2006) of data concerning women moving back to work from unemployment or inactivity, 
collected by the Korea Labor and Income Panel Survey (KLIPS). Consistent with this finding, married 
women who work are more often employed in temporary jobs than non-married women. 
Table 2.6. Incidence of non-regular employment by gender, age and marital status in Korea, 2005 
Percentages 
  Men Women 
Age 
15-19 78.3 64.1 
20-29 32.0 33.4 
30-39 25.3 40.1 
40-49 29.2 46.7 
50-59 35.0 55.2 
60 and over 60.0 75.7 
Marital status 
Not married 36.7 35.0 
Married 28.5 46.4 
Separated 48.1 56.5 
Source: EAPS Supplement, August 2005, quoted in Jeong (2005). 
23. Data on the incidence of temporary employment by age group, presented in Table 2.5, show that, 
across the OECD, male youths are almost four times as likely as prime-age men, and female youths almost 
three times as likely as prime-age women to hold a temporary job, suggesting that these jobs tend to serve 
as entry ports into the world of work. One significant characteristic in Korea emerging from Table 2.6 is 
that the incidence of temporary employment among youths (apart from teenagers) is not much higher than 
among prime-aged employees. Another significant feature in Korea, compared to other OECD countries, is 
that the incidence of temporary employment rises sharply for older workers. This feature (which is also 
characteristic of Japan) is related to mandatory retirement practices in Korean firms. Particularly striking is 
the large difference between the incidence of temporary employment for employees aged 55 and over in 
Korea and the OECD total. Gender is again a decisive factor, as after the mandatory retirement age the rate 
for males increases much more sharply than for women. 
                                                          
11. Jeong (2005) defines non-regular workers as the sum of contingent, part-time and atypical workers (see 
definition B in the Annex). 
 DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2007)16 
 23 
24. Available data (Table 2.7) also indicate that in Korea, as in most other OECD countries, the 
incidence of temporary employment is almost twice as high for workers with low educational attainment as 
for workers who have completed upper secondary education. This helps explain the relatively lower youth 
incidence of temporary work, since Korean youths have above-average educational attainment, in 
particular a higher rate of tertiary education. 
Table 2.7. Incidence and distribution of temporary employment by educational attainment 
Percentages 
  Korea (2005) EU-15 average (2005) OECD average (2000) 
Incidence 
Low 46.6 21.3 15.7 
Medium 30.2 11.3 10.4 
High 20.4 12.5 9.3 
Distribution 
Low 28.4 37.8 35.2 
Medium 44.9 38.7 44.3 
High 26.7 23.4 20.5 
a) In Korea, low educational attainment refers to lower than high school graduate, and high educational attainment refers to college 
and higher education, while for the OECD average, low refers to ISCED 0/1/2 and high refers to ISCED 5/6/7. 
Source: EAPS Supplement, August 2005, for Korea; European Union Labour Force Survey; OECD (2002), Employment Outlook, 
Paris; and OECD Temporary Employment database. 
Composition by industry and establishment size 
25. Consistent with the pattern in other OECD countries, temporary employment in Korea is 
concentrated in service industries rather than manufacturing and in small rather than large establishments 
(see Table 2.8). This concentration is even more pronounced in Korea than in the rest of the OECD. While 
the incidence of temporary employment in industry (mining, manufacturing and construction) is twice as 
high as the OECD average, it is three times as high in services. 
Table 2.8. Incidence and distribution of temporary employment by industry and establishment size 
Percentages 
 
Korea  
(2005) 
 
EU-15 average  
(2005) 
OECD average  
(2000) 
Industry 
Incidence 
Agriculture 75.0 Agriculture 35.4 21.9 
Industry 18.7 Industry 13.2 9.6 
Services 32.1 Services 14.0 10.8 
Distribution 
Agriculture 2.5 Agriculture 4.1 6.4 
Industry 15.0 Industry 25.6 24.1 
Services 82.5 Services 70.3 69.6 
Establishment 
size 
Incidence 
Less than 
10 persons 
37.3 
Less than 
20 persons 
13.3 14.4 
10-29 persons 28.9 
20-49 persons 11.1 10.9 
30-99 persons 25.1 
100 persons 
and over 
20.8 
50 persons 
and over 
9.4 9.1 
Distribution 
Less than 
10 persons 
46.2 
Less than 
20 persons 
42.4 52.2 
10-29 persons 21.0 
20-49 persons 16.4 14.7 
30-99 persons 16.8 
100 persons 
and over 
16.0 
50 persons 
and over 
41.2 33.1 
Source: EAPS Supplement, August 2005, for Korea; European Union Labour Force Survey; and OECD (2002), Employment Outlook, 
Chapter 3, Paris. 
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26. According to data provided by the Korean Ministry of Labor, within the service sector the 
incidence of temporary employment is over 30% in Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels and 
Finance, insurance, real estate and business services. Meanwhile, with 26% of total civilian employment 
in 2005, Korea has one of the largest shares of employment in Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and 
hotels among all OECD countries (although total employment in services is still below the OECD average) 
(OECD, 2007b). These characteristics of the industrial structure may be one factor explaining the high 
incidence of temporary employment in Korea, along with the concentration of temporary employment in 
small establishments. 
27. In sum, across OECD countries, temporary employment is overrepresented among younger 
workers, less-educated workers, females, small enterprises and lower-skilled service sector jobs (OECD, 
2002). These features are also characteristic of Korea, although the concentration of temporary 
employment on youth is somewhat less, and on women somewhat more pronounced. In addition, its 
concentration on employees above the age of 50 is striking. 
D. Terms and conditions of employment 
Pay levels of temporary workers 
28. A number of theoretical arguments suggest that temporary workers receive lower wages than 
their permanent counterparts. Human capital theory, which emphasises the importance of personal 
characteristics for pay levels, suggests that workers without proper skills or experience are paid less than 
those equipped with higher skills or more experience. From this point of view, lower pay levels for 
temporary workers are said to reflect their lower productivity due to either inferior skills or short tenure. 
Efficiency wage theories, which emphasise the incentive character of wages, imply that permanent workers 
are paid more than temporary workers to provide them with incentives to work longer. Dual labour market 
theories argue that workers in the secondary labour market are paid less than those in the primary segment 
as a result of labour market segmentation, which poses both economic and non-economic obstacles to 
passing from the former to the latter. However, it may also be the case that certain policies and labour 
market institutions, such as minimum wages and equality of opportunity legislation, have the effect of 
equalising the wages between the two categories of employees, if the legislation is consistently enforced in 
both sectors. 
29. According to the supplementary labour force survey, non-regular workers in Korea were paid 
71% of the hourly wages of regular workers as of August 2005 (Table 2.9).
12
 While this relatively large 
wage gap has given rise to concerns about inequality in Korea, more or less substantial gaps between the 
wages of permanent and temporary workers can also be found in most other OECD countries.
13
 
OECD (2002) has calculated wage gaps in 13 European countries by dividing mean hourly wages of 
temporary workers by those of permanent workers. According to these calculations, wage gaps in Europe 
varied from 17% in Germany to 47% in Spain. With a wage gap of close to 30%, Korea occupies a middle 
position when compared to these countries, close to the rates in France (29%) and the 
United Kingdom (26%). 
                                                          
12. On a monthly basis, the wages of non-regular workers were 63% of those of regular workers. Non-regular 
workers in the supplementary labour force survey correspond to definition B in the Annex. 
13. By contrast, in Australia within a given occupation “casual” workers tend to earn above-average wages. 
This is due to supplementary “casual loading” components in the wage which are paid to compensate for 
certain other disadvantages. 
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Table 2.9. Hourly wage of regular and non-regular workers by firm size and union membership
a, b
 
Won 
 Total 
Firm size
c
 Union membership 
Small firms Large firms No Yes 
Regular workers 
9 263 
(100.0%) 
7 994 
(86.3%) 
14 046 
(151.6%) 
8 679 
(93.7%) 
12 351 
(133.3%) 
Non-regular workers 
6 256 
(67.5%) 
6 032 
(65.1%) 
10 572 
(114.1%) 
6 382 
(68.9%) 
9 513 
(102.7%) 
a) Hourly wages are calculated as average monthly total wage / (average weekly working hours x 4.3 weeks), using data from the 
EAPS Supplement, August 2005. 
b) Figures in brackets denote the ratio of wages in a particular category to average wages of regular workers. 
c) Small firms are firms with less than 300 workers, and large firms are those with 300 workers and over. 
Source: Kang (2005). 
30. Against the background that the Korean labour market is characterised by large wage 
differentials across sectors, Table 2.9 shows two further interesting aspects related to the wage gap. First, 
while non-regular workers working at large firms (with more than 300 employees) are paid less than 
regular workers working in the same firms, they are actually paid more than regular workers working at 
smaller firms (less than 300 employees). This implies that wage differentials between small and large firms 
are larger than wage differentials between regular and non-regular workers.
14
 Second, unionised 
non-regular workers are paid less than unionised regular workers, but are paid more than regular workers 
who are not members of trade unions. Due to the combination of strong union effects and strong 
establishment size effects (Kang, 2005), non-regular workers who work at smaller firms are paid less than 
half of hourly wages of regular workers at large firms, while non-regular workers who are not trade union 
members are paid only 52% of hourly wages of regular workers who are unionised. The fact that few 
temporary workers are unionised (about 5% according to recent calculations) reinforces wage differentials. 
31. Further, against the background of the prevailing seniority-based wage system in Korea, 
Hwang et al. (2005) estimate age and tenure effects on wages using data collected by KLIPS (see 
definition D in the Annex). The main findings are as follows: wages for regular male workers increase 
continuously up to their late forties, while those for non-regular male workers start declining in their mid 
thirties. In comparison, wages for regular female workers begin to decline in their mid-thirties, and those for 
non-regular female workers already in their late twenties. As to the tenure-earnings profile, wages for both 
male and female regular workers increase rapidly and consistently with tenure, while wages for non-regular 
workers start to stagnate after about three or four years of tenure. Based on these findings, the authors 
conclude that strong tenure effects and (more modest) age effects on regular workers’ earnings reflect the 
seniority-based wage system prevailing in Korean enterprises. The male/female differences are, again, due to 
the frequent withdrawal of female workers from the labour market for reasons of marriage and/or childbirth. 
Decomposition of wage gaps 
32. The wage gap cited above of 30%, as determined by the supplementary labour force survey, does 
not take into account differences in individual or job characteristics, although Table 2.9 has shown the 
impact of two such features. For example, if youths were a large proportion of temporary workers, this 
alone would explain much of existing pay differentials. OECD (2002), using multivariate regression 
techniques, estimated the independent impact of temporary employment on wages by standardising for pay 
differences due to other characteristics. The wage penalty associated with holding a temporary job was 
always partly, but never fully, attributable to these other characteristics. 
                                                          
14. For example, according to the Wage Structure Survey the ratio of average wages in firms with 500 or more 
employees to those with 10 to 29 workers increased from 1.1 in 1985 to over 1.7 in 2005. 
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33. For Korea, Ahn (2004) decomposes the wage gap between regular and non-regular workers 
(based on data from the 2003 EAPS Supplement) by estimating wage equations for different types of 
employee with the purpose of measuring differentials that are due to a number of independent factors and 
those due to discriminatory treatment. The variables used by the author are length of tenure, occupational 
skill level, establishment size, gender, marital status, educational attainment and age. The econometric 
results showed that statistically 81% of the wage gap between regular and non-regular workers
15
 could be 
explained by these observed variables, implying that the remaining 19% of the wage gap might be caused 
by discriminatory treatment. Among the observables, short job tenure and working in low-paid occupations 
accounted together for almost half of the existing gap. However, it is open to debate whether some of the 
other factors – not only the unexplained 19% – might not also be measures of the impact of discriminatory 
treatment and labour market segmentation. Policy measures against wage and other imbalances remain on 
the agenda even if deliberate discrimination plays only a small part. 
34. More recently, Nam et al. (2005b) estimated even smaller wage gaps caused by discriminatory 
treatment. Using again the EAPS Supplement from 2002 to 2005 and after controlling for differences in job 
tasks and trade union presence, in addition to the factors listed above, the residual wage gap fell to below 5%. 
Employee welfare benefits 
35. In most OECD countries, there is a risk that temporary workers have more limited access to 
non-wage benefits, such as paid vacations, maternity or parental leave, unemployment benefits and retirement 
pensions, than permanent workers. In particular, this is the case in countries where many employee welfare 
benefits are not provided on a legislated, universal basis, but rather voluntarily by employers. Even in 
countries where temporary workers have the same de jure entitlement to these employee benefits, they may 
have sometimes limited de facto access due to specific eligibility criteria (OECD, 2002). In Korea, a number 
of employee benefits are regulated by law on a universal basis. However, entitlement to or participation in 
these employee benefits is sometimes conditional on a minimum working period or a working hour threshold, 
although the importance of these pre-conditions has recently been reduced. 
36. Mandatory employee benefits which are regulated by law in Korea include unemployment 
insurance, national health insurance, public pensions, industrial accident and sickness compensation 
insurance, severance pay, annual leave and paid maternity or unpaid child-care leave. Social insurance 
schemes which were initially introduced with relatively limited coverage have expanded their coverage in 
recent years, to the extent that most workplaces and workers are now covered. However, part-time workers 
with less than 60 or 80 monthly working hours and daily workers engaged for less than one month still 
tend to be excluded from most social insurances, despite the fact that daily workers began to be covered by 
the Employment Insurance System (EIS) as from 2004. Part-time workers and daily workers are allowed to 
join the national health insurance and the public pension scheme through regional affiliation, rather than 
the regular workplace-based membership. 
37. Paid annual leave has in the past been granted by the Labor Standards Act to workers who register 
more than 80% of attendance throughout the year. In addition, a special regulation for employees who have 
served for less than a year was introduced in 2003 (one day’s leave per month for employees who work over 
15 hours a week, on the condition that there have been no absences from work). However, this regulation 
only becomes effective in several stages from 2004 through 2011. Unpaid child-care leave for up to one year 
is granted to workers who have worked for over a year for the same employer. The same minimum of 
one-year tenure also applies to severance pay (the so-called retirement allowance). By contrast, paid 
maternity leave is granted without any condition related to length of tenure or minimum working hours. 
                                                          
15. Ahn’s definition corresponds to definition B in the Annex. 
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38. In spite of the recent expansion in entitlement to statutory employee benefits, lack of compliance by 
employers remains an important obstacle to temporary workers’ ability to take advantage of these benefits. 
Table 2.10 shows that according to survey data less than 40% of non-regular workers are protected by the main 
social security schemes. However, there is some evidence to the effect that the extent of non-compliance is, to 
some degree, exaggerated by these survey results. Concerning coverage under the EIS, for example, the 
Ministry of Labor provides different results, based on actual reporting data from administrative statistics 
(Table 2.11). Broken down by establishment size, these statistics (which, however, omit daily workers) show 
that more than three out of four employees are reported to the EIS, while the EAPS survey data imply that only 
one out of two are covered. The survey-based compliance rate for workers in small enterprises is particularly 
low and makes up the largest difference between the survey results and administrative data.
16
  
Table 2.10. Rate of compliance with social insurance schemes based on survey results  
(2005 EAPS Supplement) 
Percentages 
 Employment Insurance Public Pension National Health Insurance 
Regular workers 63.8 75.7 75.9 
Non-regular workers 34.5 36.6 37.7 
Source: Kang (2005). 
Table 2.11. Compliance with the EIS, according to survey and administrative data
a
 
Percentages 
 2005 EAPS Supplement MoL administrative data 
Total 53.1 77.3 
Workplaces with less than five workers 15.2 64.0 
Workplaces with five and more workers 62.5 80.5 
a) Daily workers are not included in the administrative data from the Ministry of Labor. 
Source: Ministry of Labor. 
39. It is not surprising that there are also important differences in access to non-mandatory fringe 
benefits between regular and non-regular workers. Based on 2005 data collected by KLIPS on the 
beneficiaries of mandatory and non-mandatory benefits, Bahn (2006) comes to the conclusion that there 
are usually large differences in the availability of such benefits (including subsidised meals, education cost 
for children, housing support, child-care facilities, employee-ownership schemes, or life insurance) 
between regular and non-regular workers. 
Training and human capital investment 
40. One concern relating to the temporary workforce is the possible lack of investment in its human 
capital. To what extent do temporary workers in fact benefit from employer-provided training? Several 
hypotheses can be put forward. On the one hand, employers may provide less training to temporary workers 
knowing that they will leave the firm in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, employers would need to 
provide temporary workers with at least some minimal training, since they need orientation or start-up training 
to perform well on their jobs just like any other employee, and since some temporary jobs serve as a 
                                                          
16. In the same vein, concerning public health insurance and national pension insurance, Kim (2005) has 
estimated, based on analysis of data collected by the 2000 National Survey of Household Income and 
Expenditure, that about 9 out of 10 households whose main bread-winner worked in a non-regular job are 
covered by public health insurance and 1 out of 2 by the national pension. Both these shares exceed those 
reported in Table 2.10. 
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probationary period for permanent jobs. In addition, temporary work agencies may wish to provide training to 
workers they place with other employers, thus collecting information about the workers’ abilities that are 
valued by their customers. In any event, OECD (2002), based on an assessment of training data available from 
several surveys, concluded that temporary employees receive less employer-provided training than permanent 
employees and that the training gap between temporary and permanent workers tends to be larger for formal 
training courses than for informal on-the-job training. Using pooled data for 12 European countries, the 
estimated effect of holding a temporary job was to reduce access to training by 6%. 
41. Consistent with international research, several Korean authors have found a negative relationship 
between non-regular employment and investment in training. Chung and Lee (2004) estimate the impact of 
firms’ flexibility-oriented personnel policies on labour turnover and training investment, using survey data 
from the Workplace Panel Survey (WPS) conducted by the KLI in 2002 and 2003, as well as establishment 
data obtained from the Employment Insurance Database. The analysis showed that in firms which tend to 
use more non-regular workers, labour turnover and the so-called “churning flow rate”17 are significantly 
higher, and that both have a negative impact on investment in training by employers. The authors conclude 
that there is a trade-off between flexibility-oriented personnel policies and investment in human capital. 
42. Other analyses based on data collected through employee or employer surveys have produced 
similar results. For example, Jang (2001), based on analysis of data collected by the WPS on training for 
production workers in manufacturing industry, finds that manufacturing employers provide non-regular 
workers with fewer training opportunities. His results showed that 44% of responding companies provided 
training to regular workers, while the share of companies providing training to non-regular workers was 
only half of this in the case of full-time non-regular workers, and only about 5% for either part-time 
non-regular workers or temporary agency workers. Even larger differences were found by Ahn (2006), 
based on 2004 data collected by KLIPS: about 15% of regular workers, but only 2% of non-regular 
workers had participated in some job training over the previous 12 months.
18
 
43. In sum, non-regular/temporary employees in Korea receive significantly less job training, not only 
compared with permanent workers in Korea itself, but also compared to temporary workers in other 
OECD countries. For example, according to the 2000 European Working Conditions Survey, 35% of workers 
under permanent contracts in EU-15 countries had received training paid for or provided by their employer over 
the past 12 months, while 31% of workers with fixed-term contracts had received such training (Eurofound, 2005). 
E. Career dynamics 
Job tenure 
44. Tenure and job retention rates in Korea are well below OECD averages. Even for regular workers 
average tenure is about one year below that in the United States, and four to six years below the levels in 
the European Union and Japan (Martin et al., 2005). One of the reasons is that in Korea tenure peaks at a 
lower age than in other OECD countries. For example, while Korean average job tenures are similar to 
                                                          
17. The churning flow rate is defined by the authors as the difference between the worker flow rate (the sum of 
the hiring rate and the separation rate) and the job flow rate (the sum of the job creation and job destruction 
ratios). It represents an indicator that “shows worker turnover which occurs in excess of the scope normally 
caused by changes in company size” (Chung and Lee, 2004). 
18. The under-representation of non-regular and low-skilled workers in further education and training in Korea 
was confirmed in a recent review of adult learning practices undertaken by OECD (2005b). Overall 
participation rates in adult learning in Korea are also below the OECD average – the participation rate of 
about 9% found by the KLIPS survey compares with 34% in the 2000 European Labour Force Survey and 
35% in the 1999 European Continuing Vocational Training Survey (Eurostat, 2002). 
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levels in the United States for men up to age 49, and for women up to age 34, they are consistently lower at 
higher ages (OECD, 2000 and 2004b). 
45. Against this background, how does the duration of jobs compare between permanent and temporary 
employment? Table 2.12 shows that, both in Korea, in the European Union and across the OECD area, the 
majority of temporary jobs last only for a relatively short period. In Korea, 62% of temporary workers have 
been in their current jobs for less than one year, and only 18% more than three years. By contrast, permanent 
workers enjoy much longer job tenure – 30% have worked in their current jobs for less than one year and 
over 46% for more than three years (data based on the EAPS Supplement). When comparing job durations in 
Korea with those of other OECD countries, job tenure of temporary workers in Korea is only slightly shorter, 
while job tenure of permanent workers in Korea is significantly shorter than the OECD – and particularly the 
EU-15 average. Table 2.13, considering workers with job durations of over three years, confirms the slightly 
below-average position of Korea in terms of job tenure for temporary workers. 
Table 2.12. Distribution of job tenure for temporary and permanent workers 
Percentages 
 Total 
Less than 
1 year 
1-2 years 2-3 years 3-5 years 
More than 
5 years 
Korea 
(2005) 
Temporary workers 100.0 61.9 12.3 7.8 4.6 13.4 
Permanent workers 100.0 29.9 14.2 9.6 6.3 40.0 
EU-15 average 
(2005) 
Temporary workers 100.0 54.3 21.9 23.8 
Permanent workers 100.0 9.6 11.2 79.2 
OECD average 
(2000) 
Temporary workers 100.0 57.6 16.9 4.3 9.9 11.6 
Permanent workers 100.0 13.2 9.4 4.0 12.9 59.8 
Source: EAPS Supplement, August 2005, for Korea; European Union Labour Force Survey for the EU average; and OECD (2002), 
Employment Outlook, Chapter 3, Paris. 
Table 2.13. Proportion of temporary workers with job tenure three years and over in  
selected OECD countries, 2005 
Percentages 
Switzerland 39.5 Poland 25.5 Netherlands 21.7 Luxembourg 13.9 
Italy 31.3 Germany 24.5 France 19.6 Finland 13.1 
Austria 29.8 Hungary 23.9 Norway 18.0 Ireland 11.8 
Greece 29.3 EU-15 average
a
 23.8
 
Iceland 17.7 Slovak  Republic 6.5 
United Kingdom 27.8 Portugal 23.2 Korea 17.0   
Czech Republic 27.1 Spain 23.2 Denmark 16.7   
Belgium 25.6 OECD average
a 
21.9 Sweden 16.7   
a) Unweighted average of countries shown. 
Source: EAPS Supplement, August 2005, for Korea; and European Labour Force Survey for other countries. 
46. The large differential in average job duration between permanent (regular) and temporary 
(non-regular) employees was confirmed in a further study using the KLIPS database and focusing on 
employment duration at the moment of separation from a current job. This study found that the average job 
tenure of separating non-regular workers was 21.6 months, in comparison with 41.9 months for regular 
workers (Lee and Nah, 2003).
19
 
                                                          
19. The definition of non-regular workers used by the authors corresponds to definition D from the Annex 
(own definition by KLIPS). This definition seems to produce higher average tenures of non-regular 
workers than that of the EAPS Supplement. 
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47. In addition to labour demand and supply factors, countries’ legislative provisions on maximum 
contract duration and number of renewals can strongly affect average job tenure of temporary employees. 
Up to 2007, Korean labour law contained no restrictions on renewals of fixed-term contracts.
20
 By contrast, 
in a European high-EPL country such as France, only one prolongation of a fixed-term contract is possible, 
and the potential maximum duration is 18 months. While corresponding data from other OECD countries 
are not available, in Korea 55.4% of workers with fixed-term contracts (who represent the majority of the 
workforce defined as temporary) said in 2005 that they had experienced contract renewals.
21
 At first sight, 
this seems at odds with the high proportion of temporary workers with very short tenure; however, this 
high proportion may be due to their concentration in certain service industries such as wholesale and retail 
trade, restaurants and hotels and in small establishments. 
Are temporary jobs stepping stones or dead ends? 
48. A major factor in assessing temporary employment is whether temporary jobs are stepping stones 
towards more stable employment or dead ends that trap workers in continuing precariousness. To answer 
this question, it is necessary to look at the mobility of temporary workers into and out of temporary jobs. 
Some research results from Korea concerning the mobility of non-regular workers have recently become 
available. Although these show some variation depending on data sources and definition, overall the 
research suggests that a considerable proportion of non-regular workers may be trapped in this type of job. 
49. Chun and Lee (2004) calculate the labour force status of wage earners over a period of four years 
using data collected by the KLIPS from 1999 to 2002. The results show that more than 90% of regular workers 
in year t continue to hold regular jobs four years later, and that as many as 44% of non-regular workers move 
into regular jobs within a year – a share that increases to almost two-thirds in year t+4. However, over one-third 
of non-regular workers remain in this employment status over the longer term (see Table 2.14).
22
 
Table 2.14. Transition probabilities of temporary (non-regular) workers
a
 
Percentages 
 Transitions by economic activity status 
Permanent 
(regular) 
employment 
Temporary 
(non-regular) 
employment 
Not 
employed 
Self-employed 
Education/ 
Training 
Korea (1) 
t+1 44.3 55.0 0.7 .. .. 
t+3 59.5 40.2 0.3 .. .. 
t+4 64.8 35.0 0.1 .. .. 
Korea (2) t+1 15.0 58.8 16.0 5.9 4.3 
EU-15 
t+1 28.5 44.3 19.8 3.1 4.4 
t+2 41.4 32.4 19.5 3.3 3.5 
t+4 51.0 22.3 19.7 4.7 2.3 
t+6 55.0 16.4 20.7 6.4 1.5 
.. Data not available. 
a) Transition probabilities for Korea (1) are calculated using data collected by the Korea Labour and Income Panel Survey (KLIPS) 
from 1999 to 2002; those for Korea (2) are calculated using data collected by the Supplement to the EAPS, August 2003 and 
August 2004; and those for EU-15 are based on data from the European Community Household Panel from 1995 to 2001. 
Source: Chun and Lee (2004) for Korea (1), Ministry of Labor for Korea (2); and European Commission (2004), for EU-15. 
                                                          
20. From July 2007, the maximum duration of fixed-term employment with one employer will be two years 
(see Section 4). 
21. NSO Press Release, 19 October 2005, presenting the results of the August 2005 EAPS Supplement. 
22. See definition D in the Annex. 
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50. However, an analysis of labour force status using panel data collected by the EAPS Supplement 
tends to show much more limited mobility of non-regular workers. According to this survey and the 
definition it uses (which is closer to the definition of temporary employment used by the OECD), between 
August 2003 and August 2004, only 15% of non-regular workers moved into regular employment while a 
similar proportion moved into non-employment and 3 out of 5 remained in non-regular employment 
(Table 2.14). 
51. Other research calculating mobility on the basis of the regular EAPS shows even more limited 
transition rates.
23
 Based on a statistical model for the period of 1993 to 1999, Nam and Kim (2000) analyse 
transition probabilities using the EAPS distinction between regular and non-regular employment. Their 
results suggest that the probability of non-regular workers to remain in that status in year t+1 is 
approximately 90% while the probability to move either into regular employment or into self-employment 
is below 2%, with the remainder transiting to unemployment or inactivity. Based on these results, the 
authors conclude that non-regular jobs rarely represent a bridge to regular employment. 
52. One explanation for the different results emerging from research using either the EAPS or its 
supplement is that the EAPS definition of non-regular employment is broader. For example, the EAPS 
would tend to classify a temporary worker who moves into permanent employment at a small business still 
as non-regular, if the small business does not pay bonuses and/or the retirement allowance. 
53. Since the evidence on temporary workers’ mobility in Korea is inconclusive, it is difficult to 
judge how transition rates in Korea compare with those in other OECD countries. Table 2.14 shows that in 
the European Union (EU-15), over one-fourth of temporary workers in year t move into permanent jobs 
one year later and that the proportion increases to a bit over half in year t+4. Further, the proportion of 
temporary workers maintaining their employment status decreases from 44% after one year to 22% after 
four years, while the probability of moving into unemployment or inactivity is around 20%. Note, 
however, that there is significant international variation in transition probabilities (not shown in the table). 
For example, based on the European Community Household Panel and other national panel data, while 
more than half of temporary employees in 2000 were in permanent jobs one year later in the Netherlands, 
less than a quarter of temporary employees managed the same in France and Greece (OECD, 2006, 
Chapter 5). With above-average mobility shown by one data source, and the opposite pattern by others, it 
is not possible to situate Korea vis-à-vis these European countries. 
54. One study on mobility by worker characteristics in Korea can be found in Yoo (2004) who, using 
standard EAPS data, calculates transition rates of non-regular male workers by education and age. 
According to Yoo, the probability of a temporary employee in year t to move into regular-employee status 
is 15% in year t+1, 21% in year t+2 year and 25% in year t+3 for workers aged over 40. In the case of 
younger workers aged under 40, the transition probabilities are quite similar for the low-skilled (below 
high school), but about twice as high for those with tertiary education.
24
 Based on these findings, Yoo 
concludes that non-regular jobs can, to some degree, be a stepping-stone into regular jobs for youths and 
young adults with tertiary education, while older workers or younger workers with less education are likely 
to be trapped in non-regular jobs. However, it needs to be kept in mind that this study suffers, again, from 
the limits of the EAPS definition of employment status. 
                                                          
23. Based on definition A in the Annex, which may include many workers at small establishments. 
24. Similarly, for 12 European countries OECD (2002) estimated that the probability of moving from a 
temporary to a permanent job was highest for medium to highly educated persons between the ages of 25 
and 35 and employed by a medium- or large-sized firm in the private sector. 
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2.3. Explanatory factors for the growth of temporary employment 
55. Theories on the reasons for the growth of temporary employment usually focus either on the supply 
or the demand sides of the labour market. Theories focusing on the former tend to emphasize demographic 
changes in the workforce, e.g. the increase in the number of older workers or the increasing labour market 
participation of married women who may prefer non-standard work arrangements. On the other hand, 
theories emphasising demand-side factors take note of companies’ changing human resource management 
strategies: according to this view, the temporary workforce has grown because firms aim to increase 
flexibility and reduce labour costs in circumstances of fierce competition and uncertainty of product demand. 
56. Most of the recent research in Korea focuses on demand-side factors. Changes in hiring and human 
resource management practices by Korean firms, which aim to increase the flexibility of their workforce so as 
to circumvent relatively strict employment protection for permanent workers and to profit from labour cost 
differentials between various worker categories, are singled out as factors explaining the growth of the 
temporary or non-regular workforce (Ahn, 2004; Hwang, 2003; Chun and Lee, 2004; and IMF, 2004). In 
particular, large companies that underwent restructuring (including the 30 largest chaebols) reduced their 
workforce by 20% and changed the composition of their remaining staff (Kim and Cheon, 2004). Some 
research also argues that militant activities of labour unions have played an important role in the growth of 
non-regular work (see Park et al., 2006; IMF, 2004; OECD, 2005a; and discussion further below). 
57. The KLI’s 2002 Workplace Panel Survey, which collected data on changes in human resource 
management practices, also shows that Korean firms increasingly favour external hiring over internal 
promotion and hire more and more under fixed-term contracts. This survey collected data on the reasons why 
firms hire non-regular workers; the main factors cited turned out to be more flexibility of employment (30.3%) 
and reduction of labour costs (32.1%) (Ahn, 2004). Broken down by industry, representatives of 
manufacturing gave primacy to workforce flexibility, while firms from non-manufacturing industries stressed 
the role of labour costs. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) focused on the need for reducing labour costs, 
while large enterprises cited a flexible workforce as the most important factor (Table 2.15). 
Table 2.15. Reasons for hiring non-regular workers, 2002
a
 
Percentages 
 Labour costs Flexibility Peripheral tasks Short-term tasks Others 
All industries 32.1 30.3 18.5 13.9 5.2 
Manufacturing 28.7 34.5 17.9 14.7 4.1 
Non-manufacturing 35.4 26.1 19.1 13.2 6.2 
Firms with  
Less than 30 workers 35.5 28.9 15.8 13.2 6.6 
30-99 workers 28.5 27.6 18.7 18.2 7.0 
100-299 workers 37.7 26.2 15.5 14.3 6.3 
300-499 workers 34.3 29.4 19.6 12.7 3.9 
500 workers and more 26.1 39.9 22.9 9.6 1.6 
a) Analysis of replies from 832 firms employing non-regular workers, collected by the Workplace Panel Survey. 
Source: Cited from Ahn et al. (2003). 
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3. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND TO LABOUR MARKET POLICY  
IN KOREA 
58. This section discusses some institutional features behind labour market policy in Korea. First, 
two major factors which are often considered to contribute to labour market duality are examined: i) the 
relative strictness of employment protection legislation; and ii) wage practices and labour-management 
relations. Next, the section discusses the social safety-net and the public employment service as two key 
labour market and social policy institutions that, when functioning efficiently, can help reduce the 
significance and consequences of labour market duality. Finally, the issue of undeclared work is presented 
as a key characteristic of the current labour market in Korea and a contributor to labour market precarity. 
3.1. Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
59. Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is a set of regulations governing the hiring and firing 
process. Although EPL aims to secure job stability, thereby enhancing workers’ welfare, there is also the 
concern that it causes undue labour market rigidity and damages labour market performance. Economists 
emphasise that strict EPL makes firing workers expensive, and high firing costs reduce firms’ incentive to 
hire. Since the mid-1980s, a number of OECD countries, particularly those with strict EPL, have eased 
their regulations with the purpose of lowering unemployment by enhancing labour market flexibility. 
However, deregulation has been concentrated on EPL for temporary forms of employment while existing 
provisions for regular employment have been largely left unchanged.
25
 The most common reform has been 
to facilitate the use of fixed-term contracts and to relax restrictions on temporary agency work. One 
significant example of EPL reform is Spain, and the Spanish experience suggests that deregulation of 
temporary employment, while maintaining strict EPL for regular employment, can lead to a strongly 
segmented or dual labour market. At the same time, it probably contributed to the significant employment 
growth that Spain has enjoyed since the late 1980s (see Box 3.1). 
60. OECD (1999; 2004c, Chapter 2) assessed the strictness of EPL for regular and temporary 
employment in OECD countries and estimated its relationship with labour market outcomes.
26
 Importantly, 
no statistically significant relationship between EPL strictness and the unemployment rate was found. 
Findings also include that EPL strictness for regular employment has a positive relationship with the 
incidence of temporary employment and a negative relationship with the transition rate from temporary to 
permanent contracts (Figure 3.1). This would suggest that stricter EPL for regular employment (in 
particular heavy procedural inconveniences linked to lay-offs) tends to increase the incidence of temporary 
employment and to limit the extent of conversion from a temporary to a permanent contract. This finding is 
consistent with theoretical predictions. 
                                                          
25. Only four OECD countries are considered as having undertaken comprehensive reforms governing both 
permanent and temporary employment: Portugal and Spain (during the 1980s and 1990s) and the 
Slovak Republic and New Zealand (in 2000 and after) (OECD, 2004c, Chapter 2). 
26. The OECD’s index of EPL strictness for regular employment covers eight indicators relating to the 
procedures involved in individual dismissal, notice and severance pay provisions, and additional provisions 
governing collective dismissal. The index for temporary employment covers restrictions on fixed-term 
contracts and temporary agency work. 
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Box 3.1.  EPL reform in Spain 
The Spanish labour market was long an extreme case among OECD countries. Spain suffered from one of the 
highest unemployment rates in the OECD area, while being among the countries with the strictest EPL and the highest 
effective levels of severance pay for permanent workers. Such a high degree of employment protection against 
dismissal can be traced back to the so-called Workers’ Statute (Ley del Estatuto e los Trabajadores) from 1980. Under 
this act, collective dismissals were allowed for technological and economic reasons, but were in fact rarely used by 
firms up to the 1990s, because of the need for prior administrative approval which involved long time delays. 
The law also made severance pay dependent on job tenure and, in case of appeal, on a judge’s decision on 
fairness of dismissal. The judge may declare dismissals fair, unfair or null. If the dismissal is declared fair, the worker 
will receive severance pay of as much as 20 days’ wages per year of tenure with a maximum of 12 months’ wages. In 
case the dismissal is declared unfair, the worker will receive up to 45 days per year of service, with a maximum of 
42 months’ wages. If the dismissal is null, the worker can be reinstated and all wages during the lay-off period will be 
fully paid. In practice, employers have tended to pay the higher severance amount in order to avoid a legal appeal or to 
more easily obtain administrative approval for collective dismissals. 
In an atmosphere of trade union militancy and persistently high strike rates in the late 1970s to early 1980s (after 
the country emerged from the Franco dictatorship), real wages increased sharply, employment stagnated, and 
unemployment rose from relatively low levels to over 20%. Unemployment was concentrated on youths who were 
unable to find a place in the labour market – at the time, the youth unemployment rate reached up to 36%. After much 
discussion about excessive employment protection, as well as recommendations from international organisations that 
firing costs should be reduced, the Spanish government in 1984 significantly eased restrictions on fixed-term contracts, 
extending their maximum duration and minimizing restrictions on redundancies. By contrast, despite a reform of 
severance pay in 1997, EPL for permanent workers continued to be among the strictest in the OECD area. 
Just after relaxation of EPL for temporary employment, the proportion of temporary workers began to increase 
rapidly from about 15% in the mid-1980s to 35% in the mid-1990s. During this period, more than 95% of newly hired 
workers were temporary workers and the conversion rate from temporary to permanent contract was extremely low. 
While the unemployment rate initially remained high, since the 1990s recession Spain has enjoyed a long economic 
boom, accompanied by a fall of unemployment to below 9% in 2006. Also, by 2006 the employment rate reached 66%, 
19 percentage points higher than in the mid-1980s – the greatest improvement achieved by any OECD country over 
this 20-year period. The relaxation of EPL for temporary employment is certainly one important factor behind these 
labour market developments; to a certain extent it has transformed the previous Spanish unemployment problem into 
one of labour market duality. 
Since the mid-1990s, the Spanish government has undertaken a series of labour market reforms to tackle the 
surge of temporary employment. These reforms tried to achieve a more balanced situation by restricting the use of 
temporary contracts, on the one hand, and by reducing firing costs under permanent contracts, on the other. In 
particular, a new type of permanent contract introduced in 1997 reduced the maximum amount of severance pay in 
case of unfair dismissal to 33 days per year of service, with a maximum of 24 months pay (but only for certain groups 
of new hires, not for existing personnel). Further, the categories under which fixed-term contracts can be concluded 
were tightened, severance pay at the end of a temporary contract was introduced and all existing financial incentives 
for temporary employment were abolished (except for the handicapped). 
Indeed, hiring under permanent contracts has increased and the incidence of temporary employment has 
declined by several percentage points since 1995, with a stronger decline in the private sector partly offset by an 
increase of temporary contracts in public service (due mainly to fiscal restrictions and an increase in ALMP posts). 
Source: Dolado et al., 2002; Kugler et al., 2002; IMF, 2004; OECD, 2001b, and 2005c. 
 
61. OECD (2004c) suggests that the relative difference in the strictness of EPL between regular and 
temporary employment constitutes an incentive for employers to hire on temporary contracts, and that it 
may have a different impact across particular groups of workers. For youth and the low-skilled, the larger 
this difference, the higher is the incidence of temporary work. By contrast, no relationship was found for 
prime-age men, women and older workers. 
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Figure 3.1. Strictness of EPL and the incidence of temporary work
a
 
USA
GBR
TUR
CHE
SWE
ESP
SVK
PRT
POL
NOR
NLD
MEX
KOR
JPN
ITA
IRL
HUN
GRC DEU
FRA
FIN
DNK CZE
CAN
BEL AUT
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 1 2 3 4 5
EPL strictness for regular employment, 2003
In
c
id
e
n
c
e
 o
f 
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
 e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
 (
%
 o
f 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t)
, 
2
0
0
4
Correlation 0.44
GBR
ESP
PRT
NLD
ITA
IRL
GRC
DEU
FRA
FIN
DNK
BEL
AUT
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 1 2 3 4 5
EPL strictness for regular employment, late 1990s
T
ra
n
s
itio
n
 ra
te
 fro
m
 fix
e
d
-te
rm
 c
o
n
tra
c
t to
 p
e
rm
a
n
e
n
t 
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t b
e
tw
e
e
n
 1
9
9
8
 a
n
d
 2
0
0
0
 
(%
)
Correlation -0.49
b
 
a) Incidence of temporary employment refers to 2005 for Korea and for the United States. 
b) Share of workers aged 25 to 64 years with a fixed-term contract in 1998 who have a permanent contract in 2000. 
Source: OECD (2004c), Employment Outlook, Paris, Chapter 2 (revised EPL figure for the Slovak Republic); and OECD Temporary 
Employment database. 
62. In Korea, a major EPL reform took place in 1998. First, EPL for regular employment was relaxed 
by introducing the concept of redundancy dismissal for “urgent managerial needs” and, second, EPL for 
non-regular employment was eased by allowing temporary agency work. OECD (2004c, Chapter 2) has 
assessed Korean EPL for permanent and temporary work in comparison with other OECD countries. As to 
permanent employment, it ranks Korea somewhat above average among OECD countries in terms of 
strictness, at about the same level as Austria, Greece and Japan (but below France, Sweden and Germany). 
Korea’s EPL classification reflects a number of protective provisions including: 
 Relatively strong procedural requirements and long consultation periods with employee 
representatives; 
 The need for employers to make verifiable efforts to avoid dismissal and apply certain 
standards in selecting employees to be laid off; 
 Generous severance pay regardless of the circumstances of termination.27 
63. Korea was also ranked above average in terms of EPL strictness for temporary work. However, 
the different types of temporary employment (fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work) are 
regulated in quite an unbalanced way. In the case of fixed-term contracts, the Labour Standards Act 
contains no restrictions for firms with less than five employees. In larger firms, the law allows (up to 2007, 
see Section 4.1 for recent legislative changes) contracts of up to one-year duration, but there is no 
restriction of contract renewal and no specification of a need for objective reasons (which is necessary in 
many European countries). Although, as elsewhere in the OECD, several successive renewals run the risk 
                                                          
27. The OECD ranked Korea low on severance pay since the retirement allowance is not, strictly speaking, a 
firing cost as it needs to be paid to all terminated regular employees. However, for the purpose of the 
present analysis, it is an important EPL feature that sets regular workers apart from most temporary ones. 
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of a court declaring the contract null and void, the Korean courts have not been too rigid on this issue and 
employers have in the past faced no major difficulty in renewing fixed-term contracts and employing 
temporary workers de facto for long time periods (OECD, 2000). In contrast to this relatively soft 
regulation on fixed-term contracts, legislation on temporary agency work is quite restrictive in that 
temporary agencies are allowed (up to 2007) to operate in only 26 specified occupational areas – quite 
different from most other OECD countries, where temporary agency employment is now allowed as a 
general principle, with only a few specified exceptions. 
64. There have been conflicting arguments in Korea concerning the nature of the 1998 EPL reform. 
Some analysts and trade unions have argued that the reform, whose purpose was to enhance labour market 
flexibility and ease economic restructuring, has caused rapid growth of temporary or non-regular 
employment. By contrast, employer circles tend to argue that the reform was not sufficient to provide firms 
with enough incentives to hire under regular contracts, and therefore request continued easing of EPL for 
permanent workers. Social and economic research in Korea also takes different views as to the role that 
strict EPL has played in the growth of temporary or non-regular employment. 
65. There is little direct evidence to support the argument that the 1998 reform has caused or 
aggravated labour market duality. While the reform permitted temporary agency work, it left regulations 
on fixed-term contracts unchanged. The available data, however, indicate that temporary agency work still 
represents only a small share of the labour force, while fixed-term contracts have been responsible for most 
of the growth in temporary employment (see Table 2.4). 
66. Some Korean literature, as well as reports by the IMF (2004) and OECD (2005a), rather provide 
evidence for the argument that the 1998 reform failed to provide firms with enough incentives to hire on 
regular contracts. Indeed, the mandatory requirements for redundancy dismissal, such as “making every 
effort to avoid dismissal”, and holding “sincere consultations” with trade union representatives, are 
considered quite restrictive by Korean firms. To circumvent these requirements (in particular to avoid 
objections by trade unions), Korean firms still tend to rely on honorary retirement, although this is a more 
expensive measure. IMF (2004) even maintains that the 1998 reform has made redundancy dismissal more 
difficult since the law prescribes stricter procedural requirements than previously set by the courts. 
However, this argument might be misleading. Before these reforms were legislated, Korean firms had 
argued that court rulings permitting redundancy dismissal could not provide firms with sufficient reliability 
since they applied to individual cases differently and thus could not be a substitute for legislation which 
applies uniformly to all cases. Also, de facto Korean courts have not always strictly enforced the 
procedural requirements enacted in 1998. 
67. As noted above, OECD (2004c, Chapter 2) found that the relative difference in EPL strictness 
between regular and temporary employment can be an important element in explaining the growth of the 
temporary labour force. The same case can be made for Korea, where EPL is composed of relatively soft 
regulation on fixed-term contracts and strict protection of permanent employment (as well as tight control 
of temporary agency work). Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that the easy use of fixed-term 
contracts may have provided incentives to hire temporary workers for firms which, particularly when 
emerging from the financial crisis, were interested in reducing labour costs and/or increasing the flexibility 
of their labour force. At the time, one of the main objectives pursued by Korean firms was the reduction of 
excessive corporate debt and to pursue this objective, they focused more than ever on increasing the 
flexibility of their human resources and reducing their labour cost by i) hiring temporary workers, and 
ii) subcontracting or outsourcing work to other companies and individual contract workers. 
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3.2. Wage determination practices and labour-management relations 
68. In the view of many analysts, trade union power plays an important part in the segmentation of 
internal and external labour markets. The insider-outsider theory, for example, notes that unionised 
employees, as insiders, are given labour market power via the high labour turnover costs associated with 
firing of incumbent workers and hiring and training new employees. In this view, trade unions represent 
the interests of their members rather than non-members, and seek to extract rents from employers via a 
union wage premium (Lindbeck and Snower, 1994 and 2002). Using the same analytical approach, 
Hwang (2003) emphasises that in Korea trade union activities have contributed to the emergence of rigid 
internal labour markets, and as a result, firms have pursued a strategy of employment externalisation with a 
view to increasing flexibility of staff use. 
69. Indeed, the 1987 democratisation movement had seen the emergence of a strong independent 
trade union movement in key sectors of the economy. Within a few years, the number of unionised firms 
tripled and enterprise unions were able to achieve substantial wage increases through militant shop-floor 
activities. This led to the emergence of a culture of confrontation in industrial relations which is still 
prevailing today, although union membership itself is in decline and the movement is highly fragmented 
and characterised by inter-union rivalry (OECD, 2000; and Lansbury and Wailes, 2005). 
70. A number of Korean researchers agree that confrontational labour relations have at least a partial 
responsibility for the increase in labour market duality (Chun and Lee, 2004; and OECD, 2005a). 
Employers are said to react to militancy and confrontational attitudes by using more non-regular workers as 
a union-avoidance strategy. This type of research is by no means restricted to Korea. As temporary 
employment has increased in a number of countries, research has analysed the effects of trade union 
activities and unionisation rates on externalisation practices and job precarity in international comparison. 
However, these studies have produced ambiguous and even contradictory results: while some demonstrate a 
positive relationship between trade union strength and the incidence of temporary or non-standard types of 
employment, others have yielded negative correlations between the two factors (Uzzi and Barsness, 1998). 
71. Korean research has produced similarly conflicting results. For example, Kim (2003) concludes 
(based on analysis of data from the KLIPS survey) that a firm’s probability of using non-regular workers 
decreases with trade union strength. By contrast, both Park et al. (2006) and Ahn et al. (2003) report 
(based on analysis of WPS data) a positive relationship between the use of non-regular workers on the one 
hand, and the existence of a trade union or the unionisation rate, on the other. 
72. These contradictory results may reflect the ambiguous attitudes of labour unions towards the use 
of temporary or non-regular workers (Lee and Kim, 2003; and Park et al., 2006). In Korea, most 
organisation of labour unions and collective bargaining occurs at enterprise level. Enterprise unions, by 
improving working conditions for their members – often exclusively regular workers – give firms an 
incentive to employ non-regular workers. On the other hand, to some extent labour unions also seek to 
limit or prevent increased use of non-regular workers and to improve their working conditions, although 
this attitude seems to be more predominant at the level of the national labour federations (FKTU and 
KCTU) rather than among enterprise unions themselves. 
73. Park et al. (2006) (based on an analysis of WPS data) found that local unions are more oriented 
to pursue their own interests and that any demands or activities of unions to protect non-regular workers at 
their enterprise remain limited. For example, most enterprise unions surveyed refuse to organise 
non-regular workers as members. Collective agreements signed by trade unions and employers often do not 
extend to non-regular workers (although the situation varies considerably by industry and individual firm). 
As a result, in some branches non-regular workers are now increasingly trying to establish their own 
separate trade unions. 
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74. According to information provided by the Ministry of Labor, only 5% of non-regular workers, but 
17% of regular workers, are trade union members. All worker categories combined, trade union density, at little 
more than 10%, is very low in Korea. This is also true for the coverage by collective bargaining (Figure 3.2). As 
of 2000, Korea ranked second-to-last in trade union density (above France), and last in bargaining coverage 
among all OECD countries for which data are available (OECD, 2004c, Chapter 3).
28
 However, trade unions 
remain firmly entrenched in key sectors of the economy, particularly in large enterprises. 
Figure 3.2. Union density and coverage in OECD countries, 2000 
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Source: OECD (2004c), Employment Outlook, Paris, Chapter 3, Chart 3.4, Table 3.3, and Annex 3.A1. 
75. In conclusion, trade unions and wage bargaining structures have contributed to the (growing) 
extent of wage differentials in Korea, both by company size and by regular/non-regular worker status. 
Section 2.2 above has shown that temporary workers are not only paid less than permanent workers, but 
also have limited access to mandatory and non-mandatory employee welfare benefits. Such labour cost 
differentials may encourage firms to hire on temporary employment contracts, particularly in those sectors 
where employee loyalty to the firm and human capital formation are less emphasised. 
76. For background, Table 3.1 presents evidence on Korean firms’ labour costs, broken down by 
establishment size. On average, direct labour costs, i.e. wages and salaries, represent almost 80% of total 
labour costs, while severance pay (mainly the retirement allowance), mandatory social insurance and 
non-mandatory fringe benefits (housing subsidies, educational costs for children, childcare, etc.) each 
                                                          
28. France ranks lowest on trade union density (10%), but among the highest on collective bargaining coverage 
(over 90%), together with Austria, Belgium, Finland and Sweden. This is the result of legislation 
promoting collective bargaining, and of extension mechanisms (OECD, 2004c, Chapter 3). 
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represent between 5% and 7% of total labour costs. The share of indirect labour costs rises with establishment 
size, mainly due to the increasing share of severance pay. If firms with less than 10 employees were included 
in the data, the comparative share of severance pay would be very low, since it is mainly in these firms that 
temporary and non-regular workers are concentrated (see Table 2.8) and since firms with less than five 
employees do not need to pay the retirement allowance. More generally, it needs to be kept in mind that the 
share of the non-wage component in total labour costs in Korea is still considerably lower than in many other 
OECD countries, in particular due to lower social insurance contributions, so that direct pay levels will tend 
to play a more important role in hiring than mandatory non-wage labour costs. 
Table 3.1. Composition of monthly labour costs by establishment size in Korea, 2005 
 
Total 
10-29 
workers 
30-99 
workers 
100-299 
workers 
300-499 
workers 
500-999 
workers 
1 000 
workers 
and more 
Monthly labour costs, total 
(in thousand KRW) 
3 221 2 388 2 537 2 623 3 325 3 627 4 611 
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
Direct labour costs (79.8) (81.1) (80.8) (79.9) (79.5) (79.0) (79.0) 
Indirect labour costs (20.2) (18.9) (19.2) (20.1) (20.5) (21.0) (21.0) 
Severance pay (6.9) (5.8) (6.4) (7.9) (8.2) (9.0) (6.5) 
Mandatory benefits (6.5) (6.9) (6.5) (6.5) (6.4) (6.5) (6.3) 
Non-mandatory benefits (5.5) (5.7) (5.6) (5.0) (4.7) (4.4) (6.0) 
Education and training costs (0.8) (0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.7) (0.8) (1.5) 
Other indirect costs (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.3) (0.6) (0.4) (0.6) 
Source: Survey on Labour Cost, 2005, Ministry of Labor. 
77. Historically, Korea has chosen to base its collective bargaining system on the enterprise. This 
particular labour market feature explains in part the country’s large wage differentials.29 Although there is 
a current trend of transforming enterprise unions into industry-level organisations,
30
 industry-level 
bargaining has remained rare, due to Korean employers’ reluctance to shift to industry-wide negotiations, 
to the existing large differences in wage level among firms in the same industry, and to the historical 
autonomy of strong enterprise unions. Presently, industry bargaining occurs mainly in the financial, textile, 
transportation and to some extent the metal industries.
31
 
3.3. The state of the social safety net 
78. An important issue in analysing labour market duality is the extent to which it is affected by a 
country’s social safety net. Most OECD countries offer both unemployment and social assistance benefits. 
                                                          
29. The wage differential between the 90
th
 and the 10
th
 earnings percentile (D9/D1) in Korea in 2005 was the 
third largest after Hungary and the United States according to OECD estimates (see 
www.oecd.org/els/employment/stats). 
30. According to administrative data published by the Ministry of Labor, a little less than one-third of all unionised 
workers are now members of industry-level trade unions (43% of KCTU members and 16% of FKTU 
members). However, this does not necessarily imply that these workers actually bargain at industry level. 
31. Much research has tackled the relationship between bargaining structure and employment performance. 
Decentralised bargaining, it is argued, can produce good employment performance through higher skill premia 
and greater responsiveness of wages to local conditions, but also tends to contribute to higher wage inequality. 
Centralised or co-ordinated bargaining systems may also support high employment, but coupled with lower 
overall wage inequality because of the responsiveness of aggregate wage demands to macroeconomic 
conditions. OECD (2004c, Chapter 3) found that wage inequality is lowest in countries where union membership 
and bargaining coverage are high, and where bargaining is centralised and/or co-ordinated. 
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Unemployment benefit is based on an insurance principle – the unemployed need to have contributed to an 
insurance fund for a specified time period in order to be eligible for benefits. For those unemployed who have 
exhausted unemployment insurance (UI) benefits or who are not entitled to them, social assistance (SA) and 
in some countries also unemployment assistance (UA) are available. SA is meant to ensure a last-resort, 
minimum standard of living. The main eligibility criterion relates to available resources of the household. 
79. In Korea, the social safety net providing income security for the unemployed is sometimes 
conceived as consisting of three layers – the Employment Insurance System (EIS), the National Basic 
Livelihood Security System (NBLSS), and the public works programme (Kim and Cheon, 2004). The latter 
element had been very much expanded at the time of the financial crisis, but was significantly reduced 
again as the number of unemployed fell from the high 1998/99 levels, and as the EIS and the NBLSS were 
progressively strengthened. Therefore, income security is mainly guaranteed by the EIS representing social 
insurance and the NBLSS representing social assistance. Despite some strengthening of both benefit 
systems in recent years, in international comparison the social safety net in Korea is still underdeveloped, 
which explains in part the strong resistance of workers to dismissal and which contributes to concern about 
the precarious labour market status of temporary workers. 
80. Indeed, employment security and income security after job loss have a complementary 
relationship, and a well-knit benefit system can enhance workers’ perception of employment security. This 
is confirmed by Figure 3.3 which shows that generous unemployment benefits tend to have a positive 
relationship with workers’ perceptions of employment security. This relationship also holds for temporary 
employees who, however, in every country surveyed feel less secure than permanent workers. 
Figure 3.3. Unemployment benefits and workers’ perception of employment security, late 1990s 
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Note: The Pearson correlation coefficient for EPL is -0.35 for permanent contracts and -0.57 (significant at the 5% level) for temporary 
contracts. Regarding unemployment benefits per unemployed, it is 0.58 for permanent contracts and 0.59 for temporary 
contracts (both significant at the 5% level). 
a) Average answer, by country, to the following question from ISSP "Do you worry about the possibilities of losing your job?" – 
Scale from 1 (I worry a great deal) to 4 (I don’t worry at all). 
b) Expenditure on unemployment compensation divided by LFS unemployment. 
Source: Data on security index taken from the International Social Survey Programme 1997 (ISSP); OECD database on Labour 
Market Programmes; OECD Labour Force Statistics database. The particular ISSP survey did not cover Korea. 
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A. The Employment Insurance System (EIS) 
81. The Korean Employment Insurance System – composed of unemployment benefits, employment 
subsidy programmes and vocational training – was only introduced a decade ago, in 1995. The EIS initially 
covered only workers in establishments with more than 30 workers, but in 1998 eligibility was expanded to 
all workplaces to address the problem of mass unemployment due to the financial crisis. Eligibility has also 
been extended in several steps to all non-regular workers. Workers with fixed-term contracts for less than 
three months were included in 1998, and daily workers
32
 were included in 2004. Further, eligibility has 
been extended to part-time workers in two stages.
33
 The EIS now in principle covers all wage and salary 
earners in all establishments except for a) part-time workers working less than 60 hours a month (or 
15 hours a week), b) government officials and employees subject to the Private School Teachers’ Pension 
Act, and c) workers over age 65. 
82. Despite this rapid expansion, the proportion of wage and salary earners actually insured by the EIS 
remains rather limited. As Table 3.2 shows, the percentage eligible for the EIS has increased from 33% in 1995 
to 81% in 2005. However, as eligibility was extended to small establishments and daily workers, enforcement 
became more difficult. The rate of contribution compliance among eligible workers remained at about 
three-quarters for some years, and fell back in 2004 when eligibility was extended to daily workers. According 
to administrative data (see Table 2.11), the compliance rate (not counting daily workers) in 2004 was around 
80% in workplaces with five and more workers, and 64% in workplaces with less than five workers. For daily 
workers, the average compliance rate in 2004 was less than a quarter, although it continues to rise. Reflecting 
these factors, according to the administrative data in Table 3.2 the proportion of all wage and salary earners who 
are insured remained around half from 1999 to 2003 and rose to reach 57% by 2005. 
Table 3.2. Coverage of Employment Insurance 
Number of workers in thousands, and in percent 
 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Wage and salary earners 12 824 12 603 13 142 13 265 13932 14 672 14 584 15 185 
Eligible for EIS 4 280 8 342 8 700 9 269 9 269 9 651 12 389 12 011 
Actually insured 4 204 6 876 6 747 6 884 7 102 7 180 7.905 8 663 
Eligible (% of wage and salary 
earners) 
33.4 66.2 66.2 69.9 66.5 66.0 84.9 79.1 
Insured (% of eligible workers) 98.2 70.4 77.6 74.3 76.6 74.4 63.8 72.1 
Insured (% of wage and salary 
earners) 
32.8 46.6 51.3 51.9 51.0 49.1 54.2 57.0 
Proportion of unemployed 
receiving benefits 
.. 13.5  16.0 17.7 19.1 23.6 27.3 
Source: Ministry of Labor, administrative data from EI database; and EAPS. See also OECD, 2007c, p. 142. 
83. Table 3.2 also shows that the proportion of unemployed who receive unemployment benefits 
from the EIS has increased steadily from 1 in 8 in 1999 and 2000 to over 1 in 4 by 2005. This percentage 
nevertheless remains lower than in most OECD countries.
34
 Apart from the relatively low proportion of 
                                                          
32. Daily workers are defined as those hired for less than one month. 
33. Eligibility was extended to part-time employees working over 80 hours a month (or 18 hours a week) in 
1998, and to those who work over 60 hours a month (or 16 hours a week) in 2004. 
34. The figure for the percentage of unemployed who receive benefits in Korea is taken from administrative sources. 
Vroman and Brusentsev (2005) report the ratio of unemployment benefit recipients to unemployed persons in 
labour force surveys in the 1990s. These ratios ranged from 0.34 in the United States and 0.38 in Japan, to over 1.0 
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2007)16 
 42 
wage and salary workers who are insured, other reasons for the low percentage of unemployed who receive 
benefits include the high share of self-employed in the labour force, the strict treatment of voluntary quits, 
and the low maximum duration of unemployment benefits (see also Hwang, 2004a).
35
 
84. The maximum potential duration of benefits in Korea, depending on the age and contribution 
period of the unemployed individual, is between 90 and 240 days. The average actual duration of benefits 
paid to claimants was 114 days in 2004 (Table 3.3). This average duration has stabilised between 112 and 
114 days since 2001, but is expected to increase from 2005 when the insured period of many workers first 
exceeds 10 years. As shown in Table 3.4, for a 40-year-old worker with a 22-year employment record the 
maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits in Korea is seven months. The comparable 
maximum duration is shorter in the Czech Republic, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, but 
much higher in most European countries.
36
 
Table 3.3. Maximum and actual duration of unemployment benefits 
Days 
Age 
Maximum duration Actual 
duration (2004) Insured period (years) 
6-12 months 1-2 years 3-4 years 5-9 years 10 years and over 
Less than 30 90 90 120 150 180 85.8 
30-49 90 120 150 180 210 111.1 
50 and over 90 150 180 210 240 150.5 
a) In 2004, among 157 000 total recipients, 36 000 (23%) were aged less than 30, 85 000 (54%) were aged 30 to 49, and 
36 000 (23%) were aged 50 and over. The average actual duration of unemployment benefits was 114.3 days. 
Source: Ministry of Labor, administrative data from EI database. 
85. Average replacement rates in Korea are in most cases below the OECD average. The minimum 
contribution requirement, to the effect that the claimant be insured in the EIS for no less than 180 days 
over the 18 months preceding the date of unemployment, is similar to that in Japan and most 
Western European countries where a contribution record of 6 months or more over a period of 1 to 3 years 
is usually needed. The minimum contribution period is a bit lower in Canada (630 hours) and the 
United States (20 weeks) (Grubb, 2005; and OECD, 2005d). Further, the Korean EIS is relatively strict in 
cases of voluntary quit: an unemployed person who left a job voluntarily is not entitled to any benefit. In 
many other OECD countries, benefits can be paid after a sanction or benefit suspension period of 2 to 
4 months (OECD, 2000). 
86. Labour market behavioural conditions for benefits in Korea are similar to those in other 
OECD countries, since claimants must be available for work and actively looking for a job. Benefit 
claimants must visit the PES between once a week and once every four weeks and give proof of at least 
one job-search action during the previous period. However, the incidence of benefit sanctions for 
insufficient job-search activity or refusal of a job or a training offer is very low. Enforcement is probably 
lax, related to low staff/client ratios, the comparatively short potential benefit period, and the low incidence 
of long-term unemployment which reduces the need for more intensive, personalised follow-up. Also, the 
early re-employment allowance in the EIS provides an incentive to find a job quickly. If unemployment 
benefit recipients find a job which is expected to last for at least six months, they are paid half of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands. Some typical shares in Eastern European countries, where unemployment 
insurance (like in Korea) was introduced more recently, were 0.13 in the Ukraine and 0.39 in Bulgaria. 
35. On the other hand, the low rate of exit from benefit prior to exhaustion would have the effect of increasing 
benefit coverage in Korea. 
36. In Australia and New Zealand, there is no UI benefit, but only assistance benefit. 
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unused unemployment benefit (or all of the unused benefit when taking a job in certain specified 
occupations). More than one in six recipients of unemployment benefits were paid the re-employment 
allowance in 2004. 
Table 3.4. Unemployment insurance (UI) benefit duration and replacement rate, 2002, 2004 
Case of a 40-year-old worker with a 22-year contribution record 
 
Maximum benefit 
duration, 2002 
(Months, equivalent 
initial rate
a
) 
Ages at which UI duration increases, 
2002 
Unemployment benefit 
replacement rate, 2004
b
 
Japan 8 30, 45, 60 60 
Korea
c
 7 30, 50 51 
Asia 8   
Australia .. .. 31 
New Zealand .. .. 37 
Canada 9 No 62 
United States 6 No 62 
Anglo-Saxon, 
non-Europe 8   
Ireland 15 18 30 
United Kingdom 6 No 45 
Anglo-Saxon 
Europe 11   
Denmark 48 Duration decreases after age 60 61 
Finland 23 55 60 
Norway 36 61 66 
Sweden 28 No 77 
Nordic Europe 34   
Austria 9 40, 50 55 
Belgium No limit No 63 
France 30 50, 55 73 
Germany 12 45, 47, 52, 57 77 
Netherlands 24 Increase after long contribution record 71 
Switzerland 24 No 70 
Central and 
Western Europe 19   
Greece 12 Minor changes by age in some cases 48 
Italy 6 50 54 
Portugal 24 30, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60 78 
Spain 21 No for UI, 52 for UA 69 
Southern Europe 16   
Czech Republic 5 No 50 
Hungary 9 No 43 
Poland 12 Minor changes by contribution record 52 
Slovak Republic 8 Contribution record over 15 years 64 
Eastern Europe 9   
.. Data not applicable. 
a) Applies to the Czech Republic, Spain and the Slovak Republic, where the benefit level declines during the UI period. 
b) Data are adjusted for taxation. They relate to the average of net replacement rates faced by single persons without children with 
pre-unemployment earnings of 100% of the average production wage. They relate to the initial phase of unemployment, but 
following any waiting period. No social assistance “top-ups” are assumed to be available. 
c) See Table 3.3 for increases in UI duration by length of contribution period. 
Source: OECD (2004d), Benefits and Wages: OECD Indicators; Benefits and Wages country chapters 
(www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives); and OECD (2007d), Benefits and Wages: OECD Indicators, forthcoming. 
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87. Table 3.5 suggests that around 70% all exits from EIS benefits occur through benefit exhaustion. 
Korean research (see for example, Hwang, 2004b and 2005) concludes from this that the effectiveness of 
PES job placement is low. However, the high figure may also reflect non-declaration of jobs by EIS 
beneficiaries (this is discussed further below). In this case, measures to minimise undeclared work are also 
needed, since PES placement will usually only propose declared jobs. 
Table 3.5. Proportion of EIS beneficiaries who found a job before exhausting benefit entitlement  
and who exhaust benefit entitlement before finding a job 
 Total beneficiaries 
during the year
a
 
Exited benefit before exhaustion Exhausted 
benefit
b 
Total Within 30 days 30-90 days 90 days or longer 
2002 
366 770 
100.0 
17.9 4.1 7.9 5.8 
47.0 
(72.4) 
2003 
423 729 
100.0 
17.1 4.3 7.8 5.1 
45.8 
(72.8) 
2004 
577 672 
100.0 
19.6 5.5 8.6 5.6 
47.6 
(70.8) 
2005 
680 758 
100.0 
21.7 6.0 9.9 5.8 
49.1 
(69.4) 
a) Including those in a spell that started the previous year and those whose spell did not end during the year. 
b) Figures in brackets and italics represent the share of benefit exhaustees among all exits. 
Source: Ministry of Labor. 
B. The National Basic Livelihood Security System (NBLSS) 
88. The NBLSS is the main social assistance scheme in Korea. It provides the poor with livelihood 
assistance along with medical care, educational and housing assistance as the last-resort social safety net for 
all citizens. Several features of the NBLSS differ from the Livelihood Protection Programme which it 
replaced in 2000. In the old scheme, prime-aged persons between 18 and 60 were considered able to work 
and therefore disqualified from applying for benefits (unless pregnant or handicapped). In the NBLSS, this 
eligibility condition was removed, and those whose estimated income (based on income and assets) falls 
below the minimum cost of living qualify for benefits. The minimum cost of living is recalculated every year 
by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and livelihood assistance and housing assistance are paid in cash to 
compensate for the difference between estimated income and the minimum cost of living. Beneficiaries who 
are able to work are now categorised as conditional beneficiaries and, in order to receive benefits, are 
required to participate in so-called self-support programmes which are designed to help them get out of 
poverty and prevent unnecessary dependency on social assistance. These are usually run by municipalities; 
however, they can also be contracted out to public or private agencies (Lee, 2004; and Kim, 2005).
37
 
89. Under the NBLSS, all those aged 18 to 64 who are not prevented from participating in 
self-support programmes because of disability, pregnancy or study are categorised as conditional 
beneficiaries. Social workers assess their ability and willingness to work and establish self-support 
assistance plans for them. Ability and willingness to work are assessed by means of a scoring system, 
based on age, health, education, work history and other considerations such as family background, etc. 
Following this assessment, self-support programmes are recommended. Beneficiaries with a low score are 
required to do volunteer work in the local community, while high-score clients are categorised as 
beneficiaries to be employed. 
                                                          
37. Starting from 2004, the Korean government allows people whose income slightly exceeds the minimum 
living costs to participate in the self-support programmes on a voluntary basis. 
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90. People classified in the latter category, who have been assessed as having the ability and 
willingness to get a job in the private labour market, are sent over to the PES, and PES job counsellors are 
supposed to establish individual action plans with them through in-depth interviews. Employment services 
include vocational training and self-support employment promotion programmes. In order to facilitate co-
operation between municipalities and the PES and streamline the registration and follow-up of 
beneficiaries, a Council of Self-Support Institutions was established, and the two separate computer 
networks – the municipal welfare administration system and the employment service’s Work-Net – have 
been linked. 
91. With the introduction of the NBLSS in 2002, the annual average stock of livelihood assistance (cash 
benefit) recipients increased from 370 000 in 1997 to 1.55 million, while the benefit levels also increased 
considerably. However, NBLSS recipients still represent only 3% of the total population (OECD, 2004a). 
Only 6% of its caseload is registered as unemployed.
38
 This implies that there are about 100 000 unemployed 
recipients of the NBLSS and therefore that about 16% of the unemployed are covered by NBLSS in addition 
to the 27% who are covered by EIS. Thus, a majority of the unemployed  receive neither EIS nor NBLSS 
payments. They may live on other family income, assets, student grants or other income sources, including 
undeclared earnings although the extent of this is not known. 
3.4. The PES and Labour Market Programmes 
92. In response to the steep rise in unemployment following the 1998 financial crisis, the Ministry of 
Labor established a new nationwide employment service network called Employment Security Centers 
(ESCs), replacing the ineffective previous public service, which had long played only a modest role in the job 
placement market. Over the space of just a few years, the number of employment offices expanded 
substantially. The set-up of PES functions as a one-stop service follows policy recommendations by the 
OECD in its original Jobs Study (1994) which recommended the integration of the three core PES functions – 
i) job brokerage; ii) unemployment benefit administration; and iii) referral to active labour market 
programmes – in order to enhance the effectiveness of labour market policies. Currently, the ESCs take 
charge of all three core functions, along with the granting of foreign worker permits. Meanwhile, EIS 
premiums, together with Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance premiums, are collected by the Labour 
Welfare Corporation. 
93. Since the last comprehensive review by the OECD of the Korean employment service 
(OECD, 2000), a number of changes have been made to the PES system, although the most significant 
reform package was not launched until 2005. These changes include the integration of the so-called 
Manpower Banks (offices created during the financial crisis, co-managed with provincial governments) 
into the ESC chain. In addition, special employment offices operated by the Ministry of Labor for daily 
workers in the construction trades have been phased out. 
94. Meanwhile, municipalities and local governments continue to provide employment services 
through their Job Information Centres. The Ministry of Labor decided to strengthen co-operation with these 
local government agencies and to expand financial assistance to them, rather than merging the two office 
chains (as had, for example, been suggested by the 2000 OECD review). The Ministry argued that 
municipalities had a relative advantage via their proximity to local residents and that they can receive support 
from ESCs to make up for their insufficient expertise in placement issues. The Ministry of Labor and 
municipalities share the internet-based employment information system (Work-Net), so that the staff working 
at ESCs and Job Information Centers can access the same information on vacancies and jobseekers. 
                                                          
38. According to the profile of NBLSS recipients published by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, in 2004 
about 77% of recipients aged 15 and over were inactive, 17% were employed, and 6% were unemployed. 
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95. Table 3.6 throws some light on the significant improvement of PES performance in recent years. 
For example, the PES radically improved its market share by increasing the proportion of registered 
vacancies and placements among total annual hirings in the economy. It also seems to succeed in filling 
vacancies received from employers at a better rate than previously. However, in comparison with many 
other OECD countries, there remains room for further improvement. For example, in the best-performing 
OECD countries the PES has a considerably higher market share among total vacancies and total hirings in 
the economy (OECD, 2001b, Table 3.7). One factor is that vacancies registered at the PES in Korea tend to 
be for jobs in manufacturing and in business services. According to administrative data, almost half of total 
vacancies registered in 2005 were jobs in manufacturing and an additional 13% were jobs in the business 
service industry, while the share of the labour force in these industries combined was only around 25%. In 
other service industries, which represent a majority of employees, the market share of the PES is limited.
39
 
In addition, more than three quarters of all vacancies registered with PES offices are for regular workers. 
More than four out of five temporary workers are employed in service industries, and less than one out of 
six in manufacturing (see Table 2.8). Thus, the lack of PES presence in the service industry also implies a 
limited role of the public service in helping non-regular workers find jobs. 
Table 3.6. PES market share in Korea, 1995, 1998 and 2005 
 1995 1998 2005 
Administrative data (000s)  
Annual vacancy registrations 130 335 866 
Annual placements 12 138 415 
Labour market data  
Dependent employment (000s) 12 740 12 190 15 185 
Monthly hiring rate
a
 (approximate) 2.7 1.7 2.4 
Derived indicators (%)  
Placement/registered job vacancies 9 41 48 
Registered job vacancies/ dependent employment 1 4 6 
Placements/dependent employment 0 1 3 
Registered job vacancies/ hirings 3 13 20 
Placements/ hirings 0 6 9 
a) The monthly hiring rate in 2005 refers to the first half of the year and is based on hirings in firms with five employees and more, 
while rates for the 1990s are from a survey on firms with 10 employees and more. 
Source: Ministry of Labor; and OECD PES database. 
96. Korean employment services remain understaffed compared to other OECD countries, and the low 
staff/client ratios are likely to decrease their effectiveness. In 2006, a total of 2 800 staff were working at 
97 ESCs across the country, implying a ratio of PES staff to the total labour force of 1 to 8 000, and of staff to 
unemployed of 1 to 300. These ratios need to be much improved considering that those in high-income 
OECD countries are often below 1 to 1 000 and 1 to 100, respectively. Good staff/client ratios are important 
for activating the unemployed and following up on their job-search strategies. Considering that total PES 
staff in Korea includes staff working on benefits and in support positions, in all likelihood less than half of 
total staff are employment counsellors or placement officers in direct contact with unemployed clients, so that 
by this definition staff to unemployed ratios are closer to 1 to 700-800. This is in contrast to the situation in 
the Netherlands, for example, where this ratio is close to 1 to 65. Similarly, in Germany recent legislation has 
set targets of 1 to 75 for youths and 1 to 150 for adults (Tergeist and Grubb, 2006). 
                                                          
39. For example, the share of vacancies received in wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels was 
around 12%, while this industry’s share in total employment is over one-quarter, and its share in hirings is 
likely to be higher (due to high turnover). 
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97. Meanwhile, public expenditure on labour market policies in Korea as a percentage of GDP is the 
lowest among the 25 countries shown in Figure 3.4. This reflects not only the low Korean unemployment 
rate, but also the fact that expenditure per unemployed person (both active and passive) is below the 
OECD average. As elsewhere, active labour market polices (ALMPs) in Korea consist of training 
programmes, wage subsidies, and job creation in the public sector (public works programmes). All these 
programmes – in particular public works which were criticised for insufficient targeting, and training for 
the unemployed which suffered from high drop-out rates – have been significantly cut back since 2000. 
Instead, a new programme, called the social jobs programme, has recently been introduced, which aims to 
create jobs in the non-profit sector. There have also been efforts to clarify the target groups of wage 
subsidy programmes. Overall, there is a need to continue efforts to enhance the effectiveness of ALMPs, to 
effectively coordinate ALMPs with the administration of unemployment benefits (a task that will become 
increasingly important as the share of benefit recipients increases), and to implement coherent activation 
strategies for the unemployed registered with employment offices. 
Figure 3.4. Active and passive labour market measures in OECD countries,
a
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a) For Greece, Iceland, Mexico, the Slovak Republic and Turkey, only incomplete data were available. 
Source: OECD database on Active Labour Market Programmes. 
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3.5. Undeclared employment 
98. Undeclared or informal employment falls outside taxation, social insurance and other 
regulations. The EU’s European Employment Guidelines call for undeclared employment to be converted 
into regular employment, since it damages tax revenues and social security contributions, and leads to a 
loss of legal jobs through unfair competition. The OECD Employment Outlook (OECD, 2004c, Chapter 5) 
emphasises, along with the two points specified by the EU, that in a number of middle-income 
OECD countries a majority of disadvantaged workers are in informal employment and as a result most 
labour market policy measures cannot reach them, and that informal employment is often a trap which 
offers few career prospects – in short, it contributes to labour market precarity. 
A. The incidence of undeclared work in Korea 
99. Although there is no simple and reliable way to measure the incidence of informal employment, 
several methods can be used to estimate it. According to results from survey-based and national 
accounts-based estimates, the incidence of informal employment in many high-income OECD countries is 
5% or less, while in other OECD countries including Korea, Mexico, Southern European countries, and 
some transition countries in Eastern Europe, it appears to be several times higher. As regards wage and 
salary workers, OECD (2004c, Chapter 5) compared the theoretical liability for social security 
contributions based on wages and salaries in the National Accounts and detailed contribution schedules (as 
reported in OECD, Taxing Wages), with actual receipts of contributions (reported in OECD Revenue 
Statistics). This suggested the overall shortfall in receipts in Korea, Hungary and Mexico in 2000 was more 
than 30%, as compared to a situation where contributions are paid on all wages and salaries.
40
 
100. Although in Korea only about 50% of all wage and salary workers were covered by the EIS in 
2000 (see Table 3.2 above), higher percentages of workers are covered by the larger Public Health and 
National Pension systems, and non-covered workers are likely to have relatively low earnings. From this 
point of view, the estimated 30% shortfall in contributions seems to be an overestimate. 
101. However, shortfalls in contributions received can also arise from under-declaration of earnings 
by employees who make some contributions. In Europe reporting of earnings at or near the minimum wage 
when true earnings are higher seems to be common in some countries. Given the low minimum wage (29% 
of the average wage in manufacturing in 2005), the percentage of workers paid the minimum wage in 
Korea (8.8%; see Table 4.1 below) seems surprisingly high. Under-declaration of earnings may be a factor 
in this high reported incidence of minimum-wage employment.
41
 
102. In 2003, 10.6 million workers, 74% of total wage and salary earners, submitted income tax returns. 
This is far more than the number of workers insured by the EIS. The amount of wages reported in tax returns 
                                                          
40. Stanovnik and Fultz (2004), in analysing the collection of pension contributions in Central and Eastern 
Europe, apply the similar concept of the covered wage bill, which is the hypothetical amount of wages that 
would generate the contributions actually collected. Their study estimates that the covered wage bill as a 
percentage of GDP ranges from 16% in Romania to 41% in Croatia, with intermediate values for Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovenia; in more developed economies the ratio normally exceeds 50%. 
41. For comparison, World Bank (2004) considers that Korea in recent years has achieved a low poverty rate. In 
the Netherlands and Portugal with minimum wages of around 60% of the average manufacturing wage, only 
about 4% of employment in the late 1990s was at the minimum wage (OECD, 1998). Eurostat (2007) reports 
that the percentage of employees receiving the minimum wage exceeds 5% only in France and Luxembourg 
(which have a high ratio of the minimum to the average wage) and Eastern European countries. 
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was about 85% of wages and salaries in the national accounts.
42
 The 3.8 million workers who did not report 
their wages to the tax authority are estimated to include about 2.1 million daily workers, who are exempted 
from the obligation to submit a tax return, and 1.7 million other low-paid workers. Although all workers 
except daily workers are legally required to submit an income tax return, some low-paid workers, whose 
income tax is calculated to be negative (based on the Simplified Tax Table used for monthly withholding of 
income tax by employers), are not submitting tax returns in practice. 
B. Undeclared work and the PES 
103. Given that a high proportion (still over 40% in 2005; see Table 3.2 above) of wage and salary 
workers do not pay EIS contributions and a lower but still high proportion do not submit an income tax 
return, unemployed workers – especially those who have been working in a sector that has many 
non-regular jobs – will have many opportunities to work an undeclared wage and salary job. Also, since 
nearly 30% of non-agricultural workers in Korea are self-employed and family workers, low-paid 
employees will often also have opportunities for working in a family business or a friend’s business. 
104. According to PES statistics (Table 3.5 above), in 2005 about 69% of exits from benefit occurred 
through benefit exhaustion. Assuming an average initial entitlement of about 4 months, this implies that as 
few as 9% on average leave benefit each month [(0.91)
4
 = 0.69]. At the same time, according to labour 
force survey statistics, in years after 2000 about 10 to 13% of all unemployed have been unemployed for 
6 to 12 months and only 1 to 2% have been unemployed for more than 12 months. This implies that as 
many as 33% of the unemployed on average leave labour force survey unemployment each month – which 
is several times higher than the rate of exit from insured unemployment.
43
 This suggests that those who 
exhaust their unemployment benefit may often not be truly unemployed: it seems unlikely that benefit 
disincentives alone can account for the low rate of exit from unemployment benefit. 
105. As noted above, PES job vacancies relate mainly to regular jobs. Employers who are offering 
undeclared work will usually not notify vacancies to the PES. A reduction in the incidence of undeclared 
work seems to be a precondition for the PES to become more effectively involved in job-matching in the 
low-wage and non-regular labour market. 
                                                          
42. This estimate appears in a 2005 joint report by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, Ministry of Labor, 
National Tax Office, and the Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion, Unified Application and 
Premium Collection for Social Insurances (in Korean). 
43. Hur (2001) cites an average monthly outflow rate from unemployment of 21% in 1998, at the depth of the 
economic crisis. 
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4. POLICIES TO ADDRESS LABOUR MARKET DUALITY 
106. Labour market duality has become one of the key issues in the Korean political debate. Most of 
this debate seems to be dominated by a concern with social equality, job insecurity and discrimination, 
coupled with the more recently emerging issue of polarisation in income distribution. However, labour 
market duality should be addressed not only for reasons of social equality, but also of economic efficiency, 
in particular due to the high level of labour and job turnover that it produces, and to its potentially negative 
impact on human capital accumulation and, therefore, productivity. 
107. In recent years, the Korean government has introduced a number of measures and policy 
proposals to address labour market duality, ranging from anti-discrimination legislation to revisions of 
EPL, and to the expansion of the social safety net described in the previous section. However, these 
measures have been rather fragmented, resulting in few synergy effects. In addition, some reform measures 
have met with strong objections from trade unions and/or business groups, due to which certain legislative 
initiatives – such as the recent legislation to reverse the trend towards temporary employment – were 
blocked for a considerable time in the National Assembly. Further improvements of the employment 
prospects and working conditions of non-regular workers are needed, and the government’s comprehensive 
plan adopted in the fall of 2006, which includes a series of measures to tackle labour market duality, 
indicates that it intends to move further ahead on this issue. 
4.1. Rebalancing EPL for regular and non-regular employment 
A. Revising EPL for non-regular workers 
108. The Korean Tripartite Commission (a tripartite institution for social dialogue, recently renamed 
the Economic and Social Development Commission) in 2001 began to discuss potential revisions to EPL 
for non-regular employment, but no agreement could be reached because of widely diverging positions 
among the parties involved (mainly labour unions, business and national government). In late 2004, the 
Korean government – despite the lack of an agreement in the Commission – submitted a series of draft 
bills on employment conditions of non-regular workers to the National Assembly. Through these bills, the 
government intended to stop discrimination against non-regular workers and prevent their overuse by 
firms, in particular by tightening regulations on fixed-term contracts. On the other hand, they aimed to 
ensure a degree of labour market flexibility by easing restrictions on temporary agency employment (see 
Box 4.1). 
109. The draft bills met with strong objections from both trade unions and business organisations. Trade 
unions argued that the measures did not go far enough toward their goal of restricting the use of temporary 
employment. In particular, they wanted the principle of “equal pay for work of equal value” enshrined in the 
law, and wanted fixed-term contracts to be allowed only for a reasonable cause. In addition, they objected to 
any extension allowing temporary agency work beyond the 26 occupations specified in the current 
legislation. By contrast, employers argued that the proposed restrictions to the maximum period for 
fixed-term contracts would aggravate labour market rigidities and thus, in the final analysis, hamper 
employment creation. In addition, they pointed out that the proposed complaint mechanism (direct appeal to 
the Labor Relations Commission) would result in costly and time-consuming litigation. 
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Box 4.1.  The 2006 non-regular workers legislation 
The Korean government, in November 2004, submitted two draft bills on non-regular employment to the National 
Assembly: i) the Act on the Protection of Fixed-term and Part-time Employees; and ii) the Act on the Protection of 
Dispatched Employees. After considerable debate, these bills were finally passed in December 2006. Their main 
contents are as follows: 
 Employers are obliged to establish a written contract when hiring fixed-term and part-time workers (written 
contracts for temporary agency workers are already mandatory under the existing Act on the Protection of 
Dispatched Employees). 
 The maximum period to hire workers on fixed-term contracts without a reasonable cause is limited to two 
years (three years in the original government draft), except that there is no maximum period for older 
workers aged 55 and over and certain categories of professionals. If the person is still on the job at the end 
of the two-year period, the fixed-term contract will be regarded as a permanent contract. 
 Overtime work by part-time workers is limited to 12 hours a week. 
 Temporary agency workers will need to be hired by the user company if they have continuously worked with 
this company for over two years. Allowable jobs for temporary agency work will be set in a more flexible 
manner by Presidential Decree. 
 Discriminatory treatment of non-regular workers – workers on a fixed-term contract, part-time workers and 
temporary agency workers – is prohibited. Workers can submit complaints against discriminatory treatment 
relating to wages and working conditions to the Korean Labor Relations Commission, where employers are 
responsible for proving that their treatment is not discriminatory. 
 The Acts are in principle effective as from July 2007. Provisions on discrimination will be introduced 
gradually by enterprise size from 2007 to 2009. 
110. The National Assembly indeed made efforts to respond to the criticisms, mainly in the direction of 
trade union arguments. The bills, as modified by the Assembly’s Environment and Labor Committee, further 
restricted the government’s original provisions on the use of fixed-term contracts by limiting the maximum 
period from three years to two years.
44
 Also, the original government plans to extend the possible use of 
temporary workers, from 26 occupations at the time to all occupations other than those expressly forbidden, 
were blocked although in the end the Assembly decided to allow the list of allowable jobs to be expanded by 
Presidential Decree. As a result of the legislative package passed in late 2006, employers are unhappy with 
what they consider further reductions in their flexibility of staff use, while some trade unions remain 
dissatisfied with the lack of precision on the equal pay issue and call for the further reduction of contract 
length to a one-year maximum. To overcome this general lack of consensus, a tripartite Committee has been 
set up to design and implement measures to complement the non-regular workers bills. 
B. Revising EPL for regular workers 
111.  Modifications to employment protection provisions for regular employment were proposed 
separately in the Roadmap for Industrial Relations Reform in the fall of 2003, and also were passed by the 
Assembly in late 2006. The new provisions provide employers with some more flexibility in dismissals: 
                                                          
44. A 24-month maximum for cumulated contract duration is also the case in, inter alia, Germany, Greece and 
Spain, while the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom have maximum periods of between three 
and six years and some countries do not regulate maximum cumulated duration at all (always with the 
caveat that in case of successive renewals of the same type of job, a court may find the contract null and 
void) (OECD, 2004c, Chapter 3). 
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 The requirement of a 60-day notice period to employee representatives in case of dismissal (in 
addition to the 30-day advance notice to the worker himself) is shortened to 50 days – the 
original proposal had been to differentiate (i.e. mainly shorten) the notice periods depending on 
the size of the dismissal; 
  Penal provisions (imprisonment up to five years) for unfair dismissal are replaced by financial penalties; 
 Employers can agree with workers unfairly dismissed on monetary compensation instead of 
re-instatement. 
112. These measures are intended to reduce the cost involved in firing regular/permanent workers. 
However, they do not tackle the generous severance pay (retirement allowance) provisions or the 
requirements to “make every effort” to avoid dismissal and to turn to previously dismissed workers first in 
case of new recruitment. Also, they will not tend to affect the “honorary retirement” practices which go 
beyond legal requirements. This said, the proposed shortening of notice periods is a welcome step, as is the 
focus in the Act on speedy remedies, since the existing remedy procedure against unfair dismissal often 
involves an excessively long period of time before the final court decision is reached. As pointed out in 
OECD (2006, Chapter 3), at any given level of EPL strictness, it is important to enhance efficiency by 
reforming the implementation of these regulations so that they are quick and predictable. Experience in the 
Netherlands shows how shorter procedures with more predictable outcomes may be preferable to employers 
compared to more uncertain procedures, even if higher amounts of severance pay may be involved (Box 4.2). 
Box 4.2.  EPL in the Netherlands and Austria 
The Netherlands provides an interesting illustration of the importance of predictable timing and outcomes of EPL 
proceedings for employers. Dutch dismissal law is governed by a “dual system”. On the one hand, an employer can 
dismiss a worker without severance payment, provided that the employer has received prior permission to do so from 
the designated public authority, the Centre for Work and Income (CWI). However, this procedure is slow and its 
outcome is uncertain in two respects: i) the CWI may deny the request; and ii) workers dismissed under this procedure 
may seek compensation for wrongful dismissal or reinstatement in the courts. 
Since the 1970s, an employer can opt instead to petition a sub-district court to dissolve the employment contract 
under the provisions of the Civil code. The court checks the request’s validity and, if the contract is dissolved, the court 
usually imposes severance compensation to be paid by the employer. In practice, the court method is much quicker and 
the severance awards are substantial, but quite predictable. Whereas in the late 1980s less than 10% of the requests for 
dissolution of contract were submitted to the courts, this proportion had grown to about half in 2002. This example shows 
that employers prefer quick procedures with predictable outcomes to more uncertain, although less expensive, procedures. 
Another OECD country that recently undertook major EPL reform is Austria, which transformed its severance pay 
system into one of an individual savings account in 2003, thus converting unpredictable firing costs for employers into 
a predictable cost of regular employment. Under the old system, severance was paid to employees in the event of 
termination of the employment contract by the employer as long as the employee had worked for the employer for at 
least three years. The payment increased in graduated steps with the length of service, ranging between two months 
and (after 25 years) one year’s pay. 
Since 2003, employers contribute about 1.5% of the payroll to each worker’s individual savings account 
(managed by a fund that invests the balance in private capital markets), from the first day of employment until contract 
termination. The accumulated balance in the account is carried over to the next job. Only employees with at least three 
years of job tenure have the option of receiving a lump-sum severance payment from the account in the event of 
dismissal. Alternatively, the balance in the account can be cumulated by the employee over an entire working life, 
functioning as a form of retirement saving. From the employers’ standpoint, the new system suppresses the specific 
monetary costs of a dismissal and the uncertainty related to this payment at the time of hiring. However, the 
contributions to the individual accounts increase their regular (non-wage) labour costs. From the employee’s 
standpoint, the new system reduces the cost of job mobility, since entitlement to severance pay is not lost when 
quitting to take a new job. 
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113. Taken together, the legislative package (the non-regular workers bills and the industrial relations 
roadmap) seems to increase somewhat the overall level of employment protection regulation in Korea – 
particularly since the original government approach of balancing out tightening of fixed-term contracts 
with far-reaching liberalisation of temporary agency work had to be abandoned. Some critics fear that the 
bills may reduce total employment. However, at this stage it is impossible to predict the impact on 
employment levels with any certainty. In any event, Korea should take care not to further increase the 
overall strictness of employment protection. After all, most research on EPL comes to the conclusion that 
stricter EPL tends to decrease the employment opportunities of both youth and women, even if the effects 
on overall employment levels are considered ambiguous (OECD, 2004c, Chapter 2). The challenge of 
diminishing labour market segmentation by both making the hiring of permanent workers more attractive 
and tightening the use of temporary employees remains on the Korean policy agenda. 
C. Reforming severance pay 
114. Severance pay is an important component of firing costs and therefore a major element of EPL 
strictness. In Korea, firms are obliged by law (the Labor Standards Act) to pay a retirement allowance of at 
least one month’s wages per year of service to all workers with over one year’s tenure, regardless of the 
reasons for termination (i.e. also to voluntary quits). The worker’s final wage, including bonuses, is used to 
calculate the allowance, which was made mandatory in 1961 for companies with over 30 employees, and 
in 1989 for those with over five employees. Many rounds of collective bargaining have even increased the 
amount to over one month’s salary per year for employees with long service. 
115. Thus, by itself the allowance does not increase dismissal costs over other termination costs.
45
 
Nevertheless, although it may be argued that the existing regulation is an incentive to longer-term 
employment and can foster employee loyalty and trust, in fact it has encouraged firms to employ temporary 
workers with short tenure and discouraged them from keeping workers more permanently. This is for two 
reasons. First, firms are exempted from the obligation to pay the retirement allowance to workers who 
leave after less than a year. Second, employers are increasingly trying to avoid the seniority-based wage 
scheme, where the basic wage tends to increase steeply with tenure. 
116. Reforms of the severance pay system have been debated for a long time in Korea, particularly since 
the introduction of a national pension scheme in 1988 and of the EIS in 1995. However, after social dialogue 
on this issue within the Tripartite Commission was not successful, in 2004 the government introduced a 
Corporate Pension scheme, effective as from December 2005. The key elements are as follows: 
 The existing retirement allowance scheme can be converted to a corporate pension scheme, based 
on agreement between labour and management. Both a defined-benefits scheme and a 
defined-contribution scheme are possible, again to be decided by labour/management agreement; 
 Under the defined-benefits scheme, the benefits payable should be equal to the current amount of 
severance pay, while under the defined-contribution scheme the employer’s annual contributions 
should be equal to 1/12
th of the employee’s total annual wages; 
 Employees moving between jobs can accumulate their lump-sum severance payments in an 
individual retirement account. 
117. Since the set-up of a corporate pension scheme and establishment of an “individual retirement 
account” is not mandatory, the government has introduced tax incentives to encourage the conversion. For 
                                                          
45. Employees or trade unions may in practice still negotiate higher payments for a dismissal than for a 
voluntary separation, but the extent of such a differential is unknown. 
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2007)16 
 54 
employers, all contributions to the corporate pension scheme are treated as business expenses. For 
employees, any income tax is deferred to the time of withdrawal from the pension scheme or retirement 
account, and the tax-exempt portion of the pension is quite substantial while that for the traditional 
lump-sum retirement allowance has been considerably reduced. 
118. From the employer’s point of view, the corporate pension scheme transforms more or less 
unpredictable firing costs into a predictable cost of employment, particularly in the case of the 
defined-contribution scheme. This can mitigate the employer’s financial cost at separation and reduce the 
related disincentive for hiring permanent workers. However, the new scheme has so far had limited impact, 
since the conversion from severance pay to a corporate pension scheme is not mandatory, and the number of 
enterprises joining the scheme has remained relatively low. Workers with tenure of less than one year and 
workers in enterprises with fewer than five employees are still not entitled to join the corporate pension 
scheme – the same cut-offs as for the retirement allowance – so that employers may still feel encouraged to 
hire workers on short-term contracts.
46
 Thus, the Korean reform of severance pay is much more timid and has 
had much less of an impact so far than the Austrian reform, which also replaced lump-sum severance 
payments with individual accounts (see Box 4.2). 
119. The Korean government is aware of the need for EPL reform to address labour market duality. 
However, for an efficient reform a more comprehensive approach would seem to be needed. If, as argued 
above, the difference in relative EPL strictness between permanent and temporary forms of employment is 
important, then Korea would have to further relax EPL for permanent employment, after having tightened 
the laws governing the use of fixed-term contracts, so that overall EPL does not become stricter. However, 
the recent revisions in temporary contract regulations in Korea have not been effectively linked with EPL 
for regular workers, and the corporate pension scheme has not fully responded to the need for 
comprehensive EPL reform and for a reduction in labour market segmentation. Making the corporate 
pension scheme mandatory for all enterprises would be a big step in the direction of a “comprehensive 
approach” to labour market duality. 
4.2. Narrowing wage differentials while maintaining wage flexibility 
120.  Policies in OECD countries aiming to reduce wage differentials between temporary and 
permanent workers who perform equivalent work can include legislation on equal treatment and/or equal 
pay between different labour market groups; minimum wage legislation; and clauses in collective 
agreements which ensure the automatic application of their terms and conditions of employment to 
temporary workers. These factors vary widely across OECD countries. 
A. Anti-discrimination legislation 
121. The Korean bills on non-regular employment passed in 2006 include provisions against 
discriminatory treatment relating to wages and working conditions between non-regular and regular 
workers, who work in the same or similar jobs in the same enterprise (see Box 4.1).
47
 This principle is 
roughly equivalent to the approach taken by the European Directive 99/70/EC of May 1999 (which 
corresponds to a text previously agreed by the social partners at European level). The Directive also 
intends to curb the excessive use of fixed-term contracts, to improve the quality of work of temporary 
employees and to outlaw discriminatory treatment (see Box 4.3). 
                                                          
46. The Act envisages an extension of the entitlement to join the corporate pension scheme to small enterprises 
between 2008 and 2010. 
47. The National Labor Relations Commission is designated as the body responsible for determining the 
existence of such discrimination. 
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Box 4.3.  The 1999 European Council Directive on Fixed-term Work (excerpts) 
Clause 1: The purpose of this framework agreement is to: 
a) Improve the quality of fixed-term work by ensuring the principle of non-discrimination; 
b) Establish a framework to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or 
relationships. […] 
Clause 4: In respect of employment conditions, fixed-term workers shall not be treated in a less favorable 
manner than comparable permanent workers solely because they have a fixed-term contract or relation, unless 
different treatment is justified on objective grounds. Where appropriate, the principle of pro rata temporis shall apply. 
Clause 5: To prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships 
the Member States, after consultation with the social partners, must introduce one or more of the following measures 
(taking account of the needs of specific sectors and/or categories of workers): 
 Objective reasons justifying the renewal of such contracts or relationships; 
 The maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships; 
 The number of renewals. 
Clause 6: As far as possible, employers must facilitate access for fixed-term workers to appropriate training 
opportunities to enhance their skills, career development and occupational mobility. 
Clause 7: Fixed-term workers must be taken into consideration in calculating the threshold above which workers’ 
representative bodies may be constituted. 
 
122. The two Korean trade union federations had requested that the principle of “equal pay for work of 
equal value”48 be prescribed explicitly in the Act on the Protection of Fixed-term and Part-time Employees, 
but the draft bill at the National Assembly did not contain this particular language since the government 
argued that the principle as such was well represented in the text. Only a few OECD countries (i.e. Belgium, 
France and Spain) have enacted legislation that explicitly requires temporary workers to be paid the same 
wages as equivalent permanent workers (OECD, 2002). It is interesting to note that the European Directive 
on Fixed-term Work does not make explicit reference to this principle, although it can be argued that it is 
contained de facto in Article 4 of the Directive, as well as other European Union instruments.
49
 
123. Anti-discrimination legislation is expected to reduce unreasonable or unjustified differences in 
wages or benefits between permanent and temporary workers. Its application may be relatively 
straightforward in cases where non-regular workers are, for example, openly denied the fringe benefits that 
a company provides its regular workforce. However, the complex, seniority-based wage structure prevalent 
in Korean firms will make it difficult in practice, even in the presence of anti-discrimination legislation, to 
determine unjustifiable wage differentials between employee categories, since wages are composed of a 
basic salary depending largely on seniority, and a number of different allowances whose entitlement varies 
for different purposes. Employers may well argue that some specific allowances are paid as remuneration 
for long-term service, rather than for the job currently performed. Therefore, changes in wage 
determination systems are one precondition for reducing discriminatory practices in Korean firms. 
                                                          
48. At present, the principle of equal pay for work of equal value is prescribed in the Gender Equal 
Employment Act in Korea. 
49. Among these are Article 141 (formerly Article 119) of the original EC treaty, and the 1975 Equal Pay Directive. 
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B. Modernisation of the wage system 
124. The 1997 financial crisis led to a 10% cut in real wages, showing that there is a high measure 
of wage flexibility in Korea. In particular, bonuses vary closely with the economic cycle (OECD 2000; 
and Kim and Cheon, 2004). However, as regards basic pay, recent surveys by the KLI and the Korean 
Employers’ Federation show that a system based on rigid, seniority-based wage steps remains dominant 
in Korean enterprises (KOILAF, 2005; and KLR, 2006). Skills components and performance-based pay 
are of comparatively little importance. Among the reasons given by surveyed firms for not introducing 
more performance-pay elements was that they lacked managerial resources or technical know-how 
relating to the assessment of individual worker productivity. Also, wage determination based solely or 
mainly on seniority-based wage steps is most prominent in unionised companies and in the public sector. 
125. The Korean seniority-based wage system leads not only to a reluctance of employers to hold on 
to older workers, but also contributes to the wage differentials between temporary workers, who have low 
tenure, and permanent workers. The government is aware of the need for reforms, but it has limited 
leverage on wage systems chosen in the private sector. Tripartite efforts seem most promising in this area. 
In the 2004 Social Pact for Job Creation, trade unions, businesses and the government agreed to establish 
the Wage and Job Research Center within the Korea Labour Institute, which aims to modernise enterprise 
wage schemes. This Center, which is financially supported by the government, is currently developing 
various models of skills- and performance-based wage schemes and aims to diffuse these models through 
providing consulting services to firms, operating regional innovation networks and holding forums and 
seminars to promote best practice. The Korean government offers financial support to employers who use 
these consultation services. 
C. Minimum wages 
126. Minimum wages could potentially have a considerable impact on wage differentials. In Korea, 
the level of the minimum wage has remained moderate since its introduction in 1988: the ratio of the 
minimum to the average wage in manufacturing first declined from around 30% to about 22% in the late 
1990s, but subsequently the minimum rate increased by over 10% annually on average to reach about 28% 
of the average manufacturing wage in 2005. However the ratio of minimum to average or median wages in 
Korea is still among the lowest in OECD countries (Table 4.1; and OECD, 2006, Table 3.10). For example, 
in the United Kingdom and Ireland, which introduced the national minimum wage in, respectively, 1999 
and 2000, the level was set at around 40% of basic full-time average earnings. Parallel to the recent rise in 
minimum wages in Korea, the proportion of regular workers paid the minimum wage rose to 10% in 2005 
and to almost 12% in 2006. This is quite a substantial proportion in view of the low wage level involved, 
which points to the large and growing wage differentials in the Korean labour market. An alternative 
hypothesis might be that earnings are often not fully declared (see the analysis of undeclared work in 
Sections 3.6 and 4.4). 
127. Reforms undertaken by the Korean government in 2005 included expanding coverage of the 
statutory minimum wage to all wage and salary earners including workers on probation for less than three 
months, and applying the full minimum to young workers aged below 18 and employed for less than 
six months. To some extent, these reforms could contribute to reducing low pay among temporary employees. 
128. The OECD’s Jobs Strategy Reassessment emphasises that a moderate minimum wage is 
generally not a problem for employment and can play a positive role in a “make-work-pay” strategy, 
encouraging higher labour market participation. But the devil lies in the detail of deciding what is a 
“moderate” level and how it should vary over time. Therefore it is important for governments to monitor 
closely whether the minimum wage results in significant job losses, particularly in the absence of 
sub-minima for youth or other vulnerable groups (OECD, 2006, Chapter 3). 
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Table 4.1. Minimum wages 
Year 
Minimum wages 
Minimum wage  
(% of average wage in 
manufacturing) 
Number of workers 
paid the minimum 
wage
a
 
Workers earning 
minimum wage  
(% of dependent 
employment)
a
 
Won per hour 
Increase  
(%) 
2000 1 600 4.9 23.6 53 760 1.1 
2001 1 865 16.6 25.8 141 102 1.8 
2002 2 100 12.6 26.3 201 344 2.8 
2003 2 275 8.3 26.2 849 000 6.4 
2004 2 510 10.3 26.9 1035 000 7.6 
2005 2 840 13.1 28.1 1245 000 8.8 
2006 3 100 9.2 .. 1503 000 10.3 
2007 3 480 12.3 .. 1 784 000 11.9 
.. Data not available. 
a) Up to 2002, figures were based on workplaces with five regular workers or more. 
Source: Ministry of Labor; and Minimum Wage Council website (www.minimumwage.go.kr/w_progress.jsp). 
4.3. Enhancing employment prospects for temporary or non-regular workers 
129. Section 2 has shown that temporary employment in Korea concerns mainly female workers, older 
workers and the less educated, and that a considerable number of these workers may be trapped in 
temporary or low-paid employment, unemployment and inactivity. This suggests the need for policy 
measures to improve employment prospects for these disadvantaged workers, thus reducing labour market 
segmentation. These measures should include, in particular, removing barriers in labour supply and 
demand that limit participation in the labour market, as well as training programmes that increase these 
workers’ employability. 
A. Measures to remove barriers against participation in the labour market 
130. Many women withdraw from the labour market at the time of marriage or child-birth and 
encounter difficulties when returning to the labour market after child-raising. The labour force 
participation pattern of women over the life-span is more clearly M-shaped in Korea than in other 
OECD countries, and many of them find themselves in precarious or low-paid employment. The Korean 
government has set a goal of raising the employment rate of women from 52% in 2003 to 55.9% in 2008, 
since the current rate is one of the lowest among OECD countries. To reach this goal, the government has 
initiated a series of measures to promote family-friendly employment practices. 
131. One such measure was to lengthen paid maternity leave from 60 to 90 days. In order to reduce 
the employer cost of maternity leave, the EIS has expanded its financial contribution. In the case of big 
enterprises, the initial 60 days are paid for by employers and the additional 30 days are paid for by the EIS; 
by contrast, the EIS pays the complete duration of the leave in the case of SMEs. However, as in the case 
of unemployment compensation, women need to have been insured for at least 180 days in order to qualify 
for this benefit scheme. While Korean women can take unpaid childcare leave for up to one year, the 
duration of paid maternity leave remains only half the average of other OECD countries where, in 1999, 
the average length of paid maternity, parental or childcare leave was 26 weeks (OECD, 2006, Chapter 4). 
As from 2008, Korea also plans to introduce paternity leave. 
132. The Korean government also supports the establishment of public and private child-care 
facilities. Employers who set up and operate child-care facilities at the workplace are eligible to receive 
financial assistance from the Labour Ministry. However, child-care costs may be a barrier to starting 
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employment, particularly for the low-paid. The government is currently considering the introduction of 
child-care subsidies for low-paid workers in SMEs in order to facilitate the take-up of employment. 
133. Next, concerning older workers there are in principle three key barriers to employment: financial 
disincentives, employer barriers, and reduced employability (OECD, 2006, Chapter 4). In the case of 
Korea, financial disincentives do not represent a significant barrier since there is no provision for early 
retirement in the public pension scheme (which, however, is in need of reform in preparation for an ageing 
population). Employer barriers and reduced employability represent more significant barriers. 
134. Employer barriers include stereotypical views by employers about older workers which can lead 
to age discrimination; the reluctance of employers to employ older workers due to the seniority-based wage 
progression; and the pervasive use of mandatory retirement. In order to tackle the link between mandatory 
retirement practices and seniority-based wage progression, the Korean government initiated the wage peak 
system which allows for wages to decline upon reaching an agreed-upon age in exchange for guaranteed 
employment up to a specified age. Starting in 2006, the EIS offers a subsidy to older workers who agree to 
join the system.
50
 Further, the government is calling on firms to increase the mandatory retirement age and 
is offering employers subsidies for retaining workers after retirement age and/or above the age of 50. The 
complete phasing out of mandatory-retirement practices ought to be considered, and age-discrimination 
legislation may be one tool to reach that goal. 
135. Factors contributing to the weak employability of older workers in many OECD countries 
include the obsolescence of skills and a lack of suitable employment services. In Korea, the low 
educational attainment level of older people may be a leading cause of reduced employability. In 2000, 
about two-thirds of those aged 50-64 had not completed secondary education – a proportion significantly 
higher than in most other OECD countries (OECD, 2004b). This explains, at least in part, why many older 
persons work in temporary or non-regular jobs with low pay. The inclusion of older workers in training or 
lifelong learning schemes could contribute to improving their employment prospects. 
B. Training programmes targeted at temporary or non-regular workers 
136. A number of studies have found positive associations between training and worker productivity 
and between training and earnings (OECD, 2004c, Chapter 4; and Ok and Tergeist, 2003). When assessing 
the impact of training with previous employers on the probability of finding or keeping a permanent job for 
an employee who participated in some formal education or training, OECD (2004c, Chart 4.9) found that, 
on average, the probability of finding permanent work increases significantly for each year of work with 
previous employers during which the employee received some training. Similarly, research at European 
level found that job training is strongly correlated with opportunities for temporary workers to move into 
permanent jobs (Eurofound, 2005). Thus, there is evidence that adult training can improve job prospects 
for non-regular workers. 
137. However, as noted in Section 2 above, temporary workers tend to have less access to work-based 
training programmes, both in Korea and other OECD countries. Eurofound (2005) cites examples of 
policies undertaken in some countries to facilitate access of temporary workers to appropriate training 
opportunities and to implement the non-discrimination principle in this respect (Box 4.4). 
                                                          
50. The government can provide up to 50% of the reduced wage, up to a limit of KRW 1.5 million each 
quarter. 
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Box 4.4.  Legal and other regulations on training for workers with fixed-term contracts 
In the Netherlands, the Law on Equal Treatment of Fixed-term and Permanent Contracts prohibits differences in 
the treatment of permanent and non-permanent workers without objective justification, and specifies that the exclusion 
of temporary employees from long-term training plans can only be justified in special circumstances – e.g. if training 
will be implemented after the contract ends; or if training would result in unjustified high costs for employers. In 
addition, a national Collective Agreement on Temporary Agency Work sets up a personal training budget for temporary 
agency workers from their 27
th 
week of employment. 
In Germany, the law on part-time work and fixed-term labour contracts provides for equal treatment of workers 
with fixed-term contracts when selecting participants for company training measures. Further, it requires employers to 
ensure that workers on fixed-term contracts participate in appropriate education and further training measures to 
promote their up-skilling and mobility, unless these measures are in conflict with urgent company-related reasons or 
interests. 
In France where employers need to spend a certain percentage of their payroll on training or otherwise pay a 
training levy, a 2005 act (based on a previous inter-sectoral agreement by the social partners) establishes the principle 
of an individual right to training, in the form of a 20-hour training credit per year, which can be accumulated over 
six years. This right is granted to permanent workers who have worked for more than one year in the company and to 
fixed-term contract workers who have worked for more than four months. 
In Portugal, Law No. 99/2003 prescribes that an employer should provide continuing vocational training to 
workers on fixed-term contracts whenever the contract duration exceeds six months. The law also prescribes a 
minimum number of training hours depending on the contract duration – ranging from 1% of normal working hours for 
workers whose contract duration is less than a year to 3% of normal working hours for workers whose contract 
duration is over three years. Under the Portuguese Labour Code, the minimum number of training hours for permanent 
workers is set at 35 hours a year. 
Source: Eurofound (2005). 
138. The under-representation of non-regular workers in training in Korea is discussed in 
Section 2.2.D above, using data from the WPS and KLIPS. Table 4.2 provides further detail on the types of 
training followed by regular and non-regular employees. Non-regular workers receive less 
employer-provided training as well as less government-sponsored training. By contrast, a larger proportion 
engages in self-selected education or training schemes. Even in the case of employer-provided training, 
higher proportions of non-regular workers tend to receive on-the-job training rather than off-the-job 
training, suggesting that Korean firms are reluctant to provide formal training to non-regular workers. 
Thus, training policy in Korea needs to be assessed from the perspective of how to reinforce employer 
incentives to invest in the training of their temporary or non-regular workforce – as part of more general 
efforts required to bring participation rates in adult education and training up to the OECD average. 
139. As opposed to training levy schemes where, as for example in France and the Canadian province 
of Quebec, employers are required to invest a proportion of their wage bill in education and training (or 
otherwise pay the levy), grant schemes providing subsidies or grants for training courses are better able to 
target their expenditure on particular groups. In the Korean system, employers who provide workers with 
training are awarded grants by the Employment Insurance Fund. Via this mechanism, the Korean 
government in 2004 increased financial incentives for employers to provide more training opportunities to 
non-regular workers – i.e. workers with fixed-term contracts of less than one year, temporary agency 
workers, part-time workers and daily workers. These grants cover not only training expenses, but also part 
of the foregone wages. 
140. In addition to financial incentives for firms, training subsidies directed at individuals can be an 
appropriate instrument when the policy goal is to increase training access for groups of workers who tend to 
receive little or no continuing training from their employers (OECD, 2005e). The government has expanded 
financial incentives and grants for non-regular workers to engage in training (again targeting workers on 
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fixed-term contracts for less than one year, temporary agency workers, part-time workers and daily workers). 
From 2008, the Labor Ministry plans to implement a “Skill Development Card system” to raise participation 
in adult learning among the same target group: under this scheme, the government plans to pay training 
expenses of up to KRW 1 million per person per year. The Ministry has also established a taskforce 
consisting of union, management and related experts who have been charged with preparing a more advanced 
action plan to facilitate training for non-regular workers, and setting up a loan programme for living costs 
during the training. 
Table 4.2. Types of training taken by regular and non-regular workers 
 Regular workers Non-regular workers 
Total 100.0  100.0  
Employer-provided training 74.7 (100.0) 63.0 (100.0) 
On-the-job training 36.0 (48.2) 40.8 (64.7) 
Off-the-job training 33.2 (44.4) 18.5 (29.4) 
Others 5.5 (7.3) 3.7 (5.9) 
Government-provided training 15.1  11.1  
Self-chosen training 8.5  22.2  
Others 1.7  3.7  
Memorandum item 
Proportion of workers who participated in training 
over a 12-month period
a
 
14.8  2.3  
a) Based on 2004 data collected by KLIPS. 
Source: Ahn (2006). 
141. There is a need to monitor closely whether financial incentives are sufficient to induce employers 
to provide training for temporary or non-regular workers. Due to this group’s high turnover rate, it may be 
more appropriate to focus training incentives on the individuals themselves. Efficient career guidance 
services and the provision of higher-quality information on training courses could also play an important 
role in stimulating the demand for training and in facilitating a better match between workers’ demand for 
training and the courses offered by training providers (OECD, 2006, Chapter 4). 
4.4. Strengthening ALMPs and Social Security Schemes 
142. Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) play an important role in reinforcing employability by 
facilitating the transition from unemployment to employment, while unemployment benefits provide income 
support during the time that the jobseeker is looking for work. Section 3.4 has pointed out that Korea is 
spending less on ALMPs than most OECD countries and that understaffing makes it difficult for the labour 
administration to pursue coherent activation strategies. To reinforce the role of the PES and increase its 
market share, the Korean government launched an ambitious reform project in 2004/05. Reforms range 
from employment service design to the introduction of performance management, and include the 
liberalisation of private placement, the establishment of regional networks, and the outsourcing of certain 
services to private providers. 
143. More generally, Denmark’s flexicurity approach which combines low EPL, high benefits and high 
ALMP spending and ensures that the unemployed return rapidly to work, has emerged as an alternative policy 
model in the Korean public debate (OECD, 2004c, Box 2.6). However, it should be noted that the Danish 
flexicurity model has been developed over many years and not without difficulty (e.g. unemployment rates in 
Denmark were high in the 1980s and early 1990s), and that Denmark spends over 10 times more on labour 
market policies than Korea. Moreover, the Danish approach relies heavily on consensus and social dialogue, 
which are largely lacking in Korea. The Danish approach can nevertheless serve as a useful reminder for 
ongoing Korean labour market reform. 
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A. Reform of PES and ALMPs 
144. With the objective of providing tailor-made employment services, the PES reform package 
introduced jobseeker profiling and an individual employment assistance plan. Jobseekers are classified into 
three groups in terms of their distance from the labour market through a diagnosis at their initial interview, 
aptitude tests and other personal and job information obtained shortly after initial registration for 
placement. Jobseekers who are job-ready are classified into Group A and provided with job information to 
facilitate independent job search. Jobseekers who have insufficient job skills or are unemployed for more 
than two months are classified into Group B and are provided with job training opportunities or group 
sessions for enhancing job-search skills, together with placement assistance. Jobseekers who lack both job 
skills and willingness to work or are unemployed for more than six months are classified into Group C and 
are provided with intensive employment services.
51
 The latter include an individual intensive interview, 
group counselling sessions for the long-term unemployed, job training, and job-interview techniques. 
These employment services are set out in the individual employment assistance plan. Meanwhile, the 
frequency of visits to the PES for monitoring independent job-search activities and unemployment status 
has been changed from once every two weeks to between one and four weeks, based on jobseeker 
characteristics. 
145. The reform package aims to create enterprise-support teams in order to mobilise local vacancies. 
Target enterprises in the local area are selected and are provided with a consultancy service on recruitment 
or comprehensive human resource management. In some areas, the PES offers to set up training 
programmes based on the skill needs of local enterprises. In addition, a local employment network is 
established, which includes the PES, municipalities, business organisations, labour unions, education and 
training institutions and private placement services. In order to create local partnerships, the PES began to 
fund municipal local employment projects, and the PES is cooperating with municipalities in providing 
employment services for recipients of municipal welfare services. In addition, in 2006 the Ministry of 
Labor carried out a pilot project for outsourcing employment services, targeted at vulnerable goups of 
unemployed workers, to private placement service agencies. Currently, an evaluation system for contracted 
providers is being developed. 
146. The reform package also aims to renovate PES organisation. The number of PES offices was 
increased to 168 in 2001, in order to complete a nationwide network. However, since the number of 
government staff was not increased, in line with the policy of small government during the period, large 
numbers of job counsellors were hired with private-sector employment status on fixed-term contracts, and 
the average number of staff at PES offices declined. In this situation, high workloads reduced the 
effectiveness of the PES and high turnover prevented the accumulation of professional experience. 
Recently the Ministry of Labor has started to tackle these problems; it plans to improve the status of job 
counsellors in order to encourage long-term employment, and has increased the number of public servants 
working in PES offices. Meanwhile, the Ministry has closed down many smaller-size PES offices and as 
of 2005 the PES was operating at 112 locations. In addition, performance management is being gradually 
introduced: PES office managers will have performance contracts and will be competitively hired. As the 
PES is now introducing such performance-management mechanisms and is outsourcing services to private 
providers, it is important to consider how to effectively measure and reward performance, especially if 
performance management develops to become a major driver of PES activity at the local level (see the 
examples given in Box 4.5). 
                                                          
51. Field visits in 2006 have shown that some offices use a four-way classification. 
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Box 4.5.  Quasi-market provision and performance management of employment services 
PES performance management and the quasi-market provision of employment services face similar 
requirements for success: performance must be measured accurately, and poor-performance organisations or 
methods must be replaced with other organisations or methods that have a good track record. Both steps take time to 
implement correctly. 
Australia introduced a quasi-market for employment services in 1998. However the first ratings of the 
performance of different providers – based on the employment outcomes achieved by the unemployed people referred 
to them – became available in 1999, and performance ratings with regression adjustments for local labour market and 
client caseload characteristics – factors that also affect the number of employment outcomes – first became available 
in 2001. About 40% of the original 300 service provider organisations were eliminated (mainly on the basis of their 
relatively poor performance record) when the second contract period started in 2000, and another 40% were 
eliminated on the basis of the more precise performance information for the third contract period starting in 2003. In 
terms of aggregate employment outcomes, performance increased modestly in 2001 and 2002 (despite the recession 
which affected OECD countries in these years) and increased sharply in 2003 and 2004. Unemployment fell steadily 
and is now at its lowest level for nearly 30 years, and Australia has also made a promising start on reducing 
dependency on non-employment benefits for certain target groups among older workers, lone parents and the 
partially-disabled. 
Employment Zones in the United Kingdom use a different method of outsourcing. Services are outsourced only 
for certain groups of clients (in particular, the long-term unemployed) in certain localities. The contracts relate service 
provider funding to performance: when providers achieve the same level of employment outcomes as the PES 
achieves with comparable client groups, a certain level of funding is provided, but providers are paid more for higher 
employment outcomes and can benefit from any savings in spending on unemployment benefits during the six-month 
period of their (potential) responsibility for the clients. In this approach, provider outcomes are benchmarked against 
PES outcomes for comparable client groups and good performance is financially rewarded, whereas in the Australian 
approach providers are benchmarked against each other and the elimination of poor providers from the market by 
terminating their contract has been a more significant driver of performance. However, both countries use elements of 
both methods, and these are only differences of emphasis. 
One key recommendation for performance management given by OECD (2005f, Chapter 5) is that contracts with 
providers should specify the client groups to be served (e.g. the inflow over a three-year period of unemployed workers 
having particular characteristics), and then during contract implementation the purchaser (government) should 
accurately define which clients are members of this client group and measure its employment outcomes. For any given 
contract, providers should not be able to select the clients whose outcomes will be measured and should not report 
outcomes themselves (otherwise, providers are rewarded for actions to game the measured outcomes rather than 
genuinely improving them). A second key recommendation is that outcomes should be measured in terms of client 
rates of dependency on unemployment benefits, employment, and earnings after the return to work. The objective for 
employment services should be to reduce average rates of benefit dependency and increase employment and 
earnings on average over a relatively long period – rather than rewarding labour market transitions at particular times 
or of particular durations. Two issues arising with this recommendation are: 
 Quasi-market arrangements, as implemented by Australia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, use 
relatively simple and short-term measures of outcomes. Since these do not necessarily capture the positive 
impact from longer-term training programmes, to encourage training separate financing streams earmarked 
for training need to be introduced; 
 More effective measurement of longer-term employment and earnings outcomes requires the use of 
employer wage and salary records, as reported to tax and/or social security contribution institutions. 
With a measurement framework which rewards providers for increasing clients’ employment rates and earnings 
as reported by employers to tax and/or social security institutions, providers could be rewarded primarily in terms of 
their success rate in getting a wider range of client groups into declared employment. This approach focusing on 
promoting entries to declared employment – rather than paying unemployment benefits and then promoting exits from 
unemployment benefits – could be an effective approach for PES engagement with irregular workers. 
For sources and further reading see OECD (2001b; 2005f, Chapter 5); Tergeist and Grubb (2006); and Grubb (2006). 
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147. In order to develop best practices for the reforms, the Ministry of Labor in 2005 operated six pilot 
centres where it significantly increased staff and finances. After operating for 6 months, the increase in 
performance at these six pilot centres was substantial. Registered vacancies almost doubled, while the job 
placement rate increased from 18% to 30%. Customer satisfaction ratings also increased somewhat. The 
performance of the six pilot centres suggests that the approach taken could be rather effective. However, 
the good performance of the pilot centres was related to the input of additional staff and financial 
resources, and maintaining and broadening this performance will require further investment. 
148. While the PES reform is in the right direction, access to the PES by temporary or non-regular 
workers needs to be facilitated. Although over 80% of all temporary workers are working in service 
industries (see Table 2.8), almost half of the vacancies registered by the PES come from manufacturing 
industries. This means that the PES does not have enough vacancy information to induce temporary 
workers to visit its front-line offices. It also means that the PES lacks the tools to effectively monitor and 
enforce Employment Insurance among the unemployed who were in temporary jobs in service industries, 
where small workplaces operate and many workers are not reported to the Employment Insurance. This 
suggests the need to strengthen the role of the PES in the service sector while reducing informal 
employment, as described in the next section. 
B. Towards a more tightly-knit social safety net and activation 
149. As noted above, Korea should seek to increase the ratio of unemployment benefit recipients to 
total unemployment from its level of less than 30% in 2004 for several reasons. This would not only 
improve income security for unemployed workers but also ensure that unemployed workers maintain 
contact with the PES. Improvements in the social safety-net and PES effectiveness are linked through 
activation strategies, which make benefits conditional on continuing contact with the PES or participation 
in labour market programmes (OECD, 2003, Chapters 3 and 4). 
150. One possible alternative method for increasing the ratio of beneficiaries to the unemployed would 
be to increase the duration of UI benefits, which is relatively short in Korea. However, this may not be 
desirable if the PES is unable to monitor work availability effectively or if undeclared employment is 
prevalent. Moreover, as shown in Grubb (2005, Chart 2), OECD countries with ratios of unemployment 
beneficiaries to the unemployed above 70% often achieve this without long duration of UI benefits.
52
 
151. One reason why the ratio of beneficiaries to the unemployed is low in Korea is that voluntary 
quitters are not entitled to UI benefit. In Korea, according to EIS statistics 66% of total job separations in 
2004 were voluntary (Hwang, 2005) and about half of those unemployed for less than one year who 
previously had a job are voluntary job quitters.
53
 Moreover, only about 40% of insured involuntarily 
separators are eligible for benefit (this may be because in repeat unemployment situations, which are 
common, only two months of benefit are paid after 6 to 12 months of employment contributions). As a 
result, only 14% of insured separators overall were eligible for the unemployment benefit.
54
 An expansion 
                                                          
52. Given that some categories of the unemployed – such as full-time students seeking work and the long-term 
unemployed in families with other income earners – do not necessarily have to be covered, a benefit system 
with a ratio of beneficiaries to unemployment of 70% to 80% can provide a reasonably adequate safety net. 
53. Source: Employment Trends by EAPS, Korean National Statistical Office. 
54. Voluntary separators in most cases move rapidly into another job, and many might better be called 
job-changers. As noted below, the average duration of insured unemployment spells (which follow 
involuntary separation) is about twice the average duration of labour force survey unemployment. This can 
explain why the percentage of unemployment with benefits in stock terms is much higher than it is in flow 
terms (using total separators as the denominator). 
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of benefit entitlements to cover voluntary quitters would increase the ratio of beneficiaries to the 
unemployed, even if a sanction was imposed for a specified period, but this would also tend to increase 
labour turnover, particularly in those SMEs where working conditions are not satisfactory. 
152. A more urgent concern for Korea is to increase the rate of compliance with the EIS. Compliance 
is particularly low in small establishments, where precarious jobs are concentrated, which implies that the 
EIS fails to provide income security for temporary or non-regular workers, and also makes it difficult for 
labour market programmes designed for benefit recipients or the EIS-insured population to be effective for 
this population. This issue is discussed below. 
153. The NBLSS requires its beneficiaries who have been assessed as having working ability and 
willingness to work – called conditional beneficiaries – to participate in self-support programmes 
(Table 4.3). The type of self-support programme is decided based on an assessment of working ability and 
willingness. Beneficiaries with low working ability and willingness are required to participate in 
employment–maintenance programmes, while beneficiaries with relative higher working ability and 
willingness are required to participate in market-entry type, social-job type and internship or business 
start-up programmes. However, most of these programmes are basically public sector job-creation 
programmes. Only relatively small numbers of beneficiaries are required to contact the PES so that they 
can be hired in private-sector jobs. 
Table 4.3. Participants in self-support programmes (as of Dec. 2004) 
Persons 
 
Total  
(a+b) 
Municipalities PES 
Subtotal  
(a) 
 Type of scheme  
Employment 
Service  
(b) 
Business 
start-ups, 
etc. 
Market-entry 
jobs 
Social 
jobs 
Internships 
Maintenance 
of work 
habits 
Community 
service, 
social 
adaptation 
program 
Participants 
in an 
average 
quarter 
57 990 54 895 3 430 5 480 13 854 287 28 611 3 233 3 095 
Total 
annual 
participants 
112 771 107 393 6 848 11 714 25 403 521 56 229 6 678 5 378 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
154. According to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, only 5% or 6% of participants each year are 
able to increase their income above the poverty line through participation in the self-support programmes. 
This may partly reflect the fact that only highly-disadvantaged working-age people qualify for NBLSS, but 
it suggests that performance of the self-support programmes needs to be enhanced. Along with delivery of 
more effective employment services, there is a need to strengthen incentives to find a job under the 
NBLSS. At present the NBLSS suspends benefits for three months when the beneficiaries refuse to 
participate in required programmes, and the PES or contracted agencies for the programme are asked to 
report non-compliance by beneficiaries to municipalities. 
155. In-work benefit programmes are increasingly used by the OECD countries as a means of raising 
the financial returns from work. The main idea is that offering a top-up to the earnings of low-paid workers 
makes employment more desirable compared to non-employment. Therefore, in-work benefits are not paid 
unless hours of work exceed some minimal threshold, and in-work benefits typically increase 
proportionately with earnings until a maximum benefit level is reached. A number of empirical studies 
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have concluded that a well-designed system of in-work benefits can have a positive overall impact on 
employment. In particular, where in-work poverty is of concern, in-work benefits have proved to be an 
effective tool of raising family income of low-pay workers (OECD, 2006, Chapter 3). The Korean 
government has decided to introduce in-work benefits – i.e. the Earned Income Tax Credit scheme – in 
several years’ time, and the government expects this to increase work incentives. 
156. Although the effectiveness of in-work benefits depends basically on their design, a major 
problem in Korea is the tax authority’s lack of adequate data on earnings. As discussed further below, the 
tax authority lacks wage information for over a quarter of wage and salary earners, and income information 
for most of the self-employed is lacking or is estimated without book-keeping. Reforms to improve income 
reporting should therefore be given a higher priority. 
C. Policies to minimise undeclared employment 
Tax and social insurance coverage in Korea 
157. Korea adopted a global personal income tax (under which virtually all personal income is 
aggregated and taxed together, in contrast to the previous system with separate schedules for five different 
types of income) in 1974, and introduced a value-added tax at a 10% rate in 1977. However, financial 
incomes remained largely outside the tax net. In 1993 the introduction of the real-name system for all 
financial transactions and property registration, to replace the practice of using false names to avoid 
taxation, was announced. However, a key measure – the inclusion of financial income in excess of 
KRW 40 million in the global income tax base – only began to be implemented in 1996 and 1997, and was 
suspended in the 1998 economic crisis, but reintroduced in 2001 (Chun, 2002; and Hong, 2002). The 
Korean tax administration in the 2000s has been active in seeking to improve compliance and maintain 
safeguards against lobbying, bribery and arbitrary tax assessments. But despite rapid progress, difficulties 
in taxing the incomes of small businesses remain significant. 
158. Of Korea’s four major social insurance systems, Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance 
was introduced in 1964; Health Insurance in 1977; the National Pension in 1988; and Employment 
Insurance in 1995. Contributions for regular employees are paid by their employers. However, employers 
have not (until 2006) been required to provide details of the wages they pay to daily workers, i.e. they were 
able to list wages paid to daily workers as a tax-deductible expense without identifying the individual 
recipients of wage payments. At the same time, as noted above, there continue to be many wage and salary 
workers who do not personally submit an income tax return. 
159. In this context, SME employees, non-regular workers and daily workers have in principle been 
covered – along with the self-employed – by personal contributions to regional health insurance funds 
(Park, 2003). Many regional health insurance funds were created in the 1980s. Proposals to integrate 
regional health funds with occupational funds started in the 1980s and continued throughout the 1990s but 
have remained controversial since – given the low contribution levels in the regional funds – integration 
would involve cross-subsidisation of regional funds by the occupational funds. In 1999, the principle of 
integration was enacted. However, the collection of premiums from the self-employed continues to be 
based on a system of contribution classes, which can be determined on the basis of proxies such as an 
individual’s property and car ownership, as well as income.55 Ishizuka (2003) suggests that the incomes 
reported by the self-employed for health insurance can be only 30% of their real incomes. Thus, difficulties 
in assessing the incomes of the self-employed also remain significant. 
                                                          
55. Premiums for Public Health and National Pension insurance are based on the classification of contributors 
into 100 grades for Public Health insurance and 45 grades for National Pension insurance (Jang, 2007). 
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160. According to administrative statistics, in 2005 8.1 million employees were insured in the 
Employment Insurance System (EIS), which is similar to the number insured as employees in the Health 
Insurance System and National Pension systems (8.3 million and 8.0 million respectively).
56
 However, 
overall coverage rates for the EIS are much lower because many employees have separate Health and 
Pension coverage through contributions to regional insurance funds. The Ministry of Labor finds that the 
enforcement of EI contributions in smaller establishments is very difficult. Administrative data suggest that 
in 2005 wages were reported to the EIS in respect of 64% of workers (other than daily workers) in 
workplaces with less than five workers and 81% in workplaces with more than five workers (Table 2.11 
above). Staff working at the social security administration explain that reasons for the difficulties in 
enforcement include: a) start-ups and closures of small enterprises are too frequent for the social security 
administration to be able to inspect the workplaces; b) hirings and separations are too frequent for 
employers to be able to easily report them to the social security administration; and c) wage records are not 
well maintained in small enterprises. 
Integration of the collection of different social insurance contributions 
161. Integration of the collection of different social insurance contributions is likely to reduce 
administration costs and achieve higher coverage than separate collection by different social insurance 
institutions (Box 4.6). One barrier to integration in Korea has been the difference in the income base used 
for calculation of premiums. Premiums for Public Health and National Pension insurance are based on 
taxable income as defined by the Income Tax Act in the previous year, while EIS premiums are based on 
the wage defined by labour law in the current year. Some deductions are allowed against taxable income 
under tax law but not against the wage under labour law, and vice versa, although the amounts involved are 
not large.
57
 The Public Health and National Pension insurances therefore have a relative advantage in terms 
of information exchange with the tax authority. These differences arise partly because each social 
insurance has been designed and implemented by different ministries, but also because UI entitlements 
require the most complex record-keeping, being ideally based on records of the individual’s monthly 
contributions up to the month of separation from the last job. 
162. In November 2005, the Korean government announced a plan to unify the collection of social 
insurance contributions and to promote the sharing of information with the tax authorities. Some key 
elements of the plan were (Jang, 2007): 
 all social insurance premiums will be calculated based on taxable income used by income tax;  
 the amount of each social insurance premium will be notified by each administration based on 
taxable income in the preceding year, reported in tax returns early in the year; 
 the form of the monthly tax withholding report, which employers are required to submit to the tax 
authority each month, will be changed so that social insurance administrators can easily identify 
the workers and their taxable income by the tax identification number. 
                                                          
56. The figures cited in this sentence are reported by Jang (2007, Tables 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4). Table 3.2 here cites 
a figure of 8.7 million workers actually insured for EI in 2005 (a somewhat higher number, perhaps 
because it includes insured unemployed workers). 
57. Allowances which are treated differently for taxable income and the wage include the performance-based 
bonus, which is included in taxable income under tax law, but is not included in the wage under labour law. 
The Korean government estimates that the wage represents on average 95.8% of the taxable wage (i.e. the 
wage component of taxable income) However, the gap is different by size of enterprises. In large 
enterprises, the wage is smaller than the taxable wage due to the performance-based bonus, but in small 
enterprises, the wage is larger. 
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Box 4.6.  The case for integrated collection of social insurance contributions 
Unless they can use existing sources of information, social insurance administrations often need to visit worksites 
to determine the number and the names of the workers present and their taxable wages. In the small firm sector, due 
to high enterprise and worker turnover, such visits and inspections need to be frequent to be effective, but this would 
be very costly. Low EI contribution rates (up to 1.75% of wages for the employer and the employee together in Korea), 
given that collection costs cannot reasonably exceed a few percent of the amount collected,
58
 are a structural barrier to 
full coverage of the small firm sector by the EI administration acting in isolation. 
Economies of scale are possible from coordinated collection (via exchange of information between 
administrations) or fully integrated collection of different social insurance contributions premiums and income taxes. 
Barrand et al. (2004) describe the commonality of the core processes involved in collecting contributions and claim that 
countries which have integrated collection “have found that the marginal costs of expanding systems used for tax 
administration to include social security contributions are relatively minor”. In an integrated system, employers and 
other contributors remit single payments for all their obligations to the revenue administration, often including 
withholding of employee liabilities for tax and social contributions. So far as possible, reporting requirements are 
aligned and the number of separate reports that employers must make based on payroll information is minimised. 
Integrated collection thus reduces the total administrative burden for individuals, employers and the revenue 
administration. Further advantages are that: 
 Integrated collection ensures that information-sharing (e.g. between corporate tax, personal income tax and 
social security contribution records) is considered legitimate in terms of data protection safeguards. 
 Total contribution rates for income taxes and social contributions are relatively high (in Korea, the employee 
and employer contribution rates for the four main social insurances total about 15%: Hur, 2003). For an 
integrated collection agency, additional work on improving the coverage of small-firm and high-turnover 
employment is more economically viable than it would be for any separate administration that collects only a 
few percent of the detected earnings. 
 Integrated collection prevents workers from contributing to insurance schemes strategically, i.e. contributing 
to each insurance only in circumstances or at times in the life-cycle when they expect to claim back more 
than they contribute. If social insurance schemes do not enforce contribution payment by individuals who 
are unlikely to get back as much as they contribute, they are financially non-viable and thus are unlikely to 
provide universal coverage in the long term. 
Social security and income tax collection are integrated in nearly half of OECD countries (OECD, 2004c, 
Chapter 5). Formerly separate systems have been integrated in Ireland (1981), Sweden (from 1975 to 1985), the 
United Kingdom (1999) and the Netherlands (from 1997 to 2005) (Jang, 2007). Barrand et al. (2004) also note that the 
majority of Eastern European countries have either implemented integrated collection or are in process of integrating. 
However, the categorisation of countries is not precise since many countries combine elements of an integrated 
collection system with elements of a parallel system where the social security administration and income tax 
administrations collect revenues separately but exchange data and co-operate in other ways (Zaglmayer et al., 2005). 
 
163. This plan was expected to remove most obstacles to sharing information among social insurance 
administrators and the tax authority, but not to achieve full integration of the functions of collection or 
workplace inspection. But following further work, a bill proposed to the National Assembly on 
16 November 2006 now anticipates the creation of a new agency for the collection of all social 
contributions under the administration of the National Tax Service (Jang, 2007). 
164. The government also decided to introduce in several years’ time an Earned Income Tax Credit. It 
mandated all workers including daily workers to submit tax returns as from 2005, and increased penalties 
                                                          
58. Barrand et al. (2004, p. 7) comment that “In mature, well-run social security systems, administrative costs 
of pension programs are often less than one percent of contribution collections... A higher cost structure 
may be experienced in the early years of a new pension system, or when reforming an existing system to 
meet current needs.” 
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for non-compliance, since the collection of information on income for low-income workers is important for 
this measure. This measure will make it possible to convert the criteria for exemption from social insurance 
contributions away from minimum working-hour or working-period thresholds to a minimum-earnings 
threshold, and to monitor compliance with social security schemes more effectively. 
Taxation of profits 
165. The integrated management of income tax and social insurance contribution liabilities does not 
remove incentives for employers and employees to collude in the non-declaration or under-declaration of 
employee earnings. The declaration of wages and salaries is most effectively implemented through a 
top-down approach where the tax authorities focus their detection efforts on business incomes, i.e. firms’ 
sales. When business sales are accurately documented, employers are motivated to hire their low-earning 
employees on a formal basis, whenever possible (Box 4.7). 
Box 4.7.  Employer taxation and the declaration of employees 
Effective taxation of profits is achieved when tax authorities reliably document business sales of goods and 
services. Profits – the difference between sales and input costs – are taxed at a relatively high marginal rate because: 
 Self-employed owners of unincorporated businesses typically have higher total incomes than their employees; 
 If the business is incorporated, profits paid out to owners of the business are subject to double taxation 
(corporate income tax on profits as well as personal income tax on any dividends that are distributed to the 
owners of the business). 
When sales are detected, employers are only able to pay their employees in cash out of profits that have already 
paid tax at a high rate. It becomes more tax-efficient for employers and their employees in co-operation to declare their 
wage payments, so that they can be treated as deductions from taxable profits. This is particularly the case for 
low-paid employees, who are taxed at a low rate. This reflects the general principle that under progressive individual 
income taxation, private sector actors have an incentive to split declared incomes across as many individuals as 
possible. For example, under progressive taxation it is tax-efficient for a family business to declare its profits not as the 
income only of a head of family, but rather as the shared income of several business partners and/or employees. 
The tax authorities require employers to list the amounts paid to each employee – i.e. wages and salaries should 
only be allowed as a deduction from sales income when this information is provided. Employers then act as agents for 
the tax authorities in collecting taxes based on wages and salaries throughout the economy. This arrangement is 
essential to ensure high levels of declaration of low-paid work, since tax and social security inspectorates never have 
enough resources to directly detect all labour input in the economy through direct inspection methods. Because 
employers bear the administration costs of documenting their payments to individual workers, they have, to the extent 
that highly unstable employment patterns are costly to document, an appropriate incentive to reduce labour turnover 
which is not present if the costs of documenting erratic earnings are borne only by the tax administration. 
Use of this system can largely remove the need for labour or social security inspectorates that concentrate on 
directly detecting undeclared work through worksite visits and related techniques. Labour or social security inspectorate 
activity to detect undeclared work is a significant feature in the labour markets of European countries such as Belgium, 
France and Spain, and in many middle-income countries with large informal economies.
59
 However, this function hardly 
exists in English-speaking OECD countries, and seems also to be relatively unimportant in Nordic countries. Citations in 
OECD (2004c, Chapter 5) describe how the tax authorities in Australia and the United Kingdom focus their efforts on the 
detection of undeclared business incomes (sales), rather than on detecting undeclared work as such. 
 
                                                          
59. However, enforcement efforts vary. Some middle-income countries appear to treat the payment of social 
insurance contributions (which is often the only tax directly payable by most employees) as optional in 
large areas of the labour market, and engage in little enforcement activity for this reason. 
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Book-keeping by the self-employed 
166. To achieve low levels of undeclared work through the top-down approach described in Box 4.7, 
self-employed people with employees must reliably be taxed on the basis of their real incomes (i.e. profits 
from their business activity), rather than on the basis of "simplified" tax regimes (lump-sum taxes, or 
assessment on the basis of weak proxies, such as the floor area of a shop). OECD (2004c, Chapter 5) noted 
that the self-employed in the Czech Republic, Greece and Portugal were allowed to pay lump-sum 
contributions or lower contribution rates than employees, and the self-employed in Hungary, Mexico and 
Spain had access to special simplified tax regimes. Under simplified tax regimes, the marginal tax rate on 
business incomes is zero or close to zero, and this leaves the self-employed with a strong incentive to pay 
their employees in cash. 
167. In Korea, although there are about 5 million self-employed, only 2 million employers and 
1 million individual taxpayers in 2004 made a VAT return based on book-keeping, the remainder either 
being tax-exempt or paying VAT based on simplified book-keeping and estimated reports (Jang, 2007, 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6).
60
 The Korean government plans to gradually expand the proportion of self-employed 
who are required to report their income based on book-keeping rather than estimation. 
168. The submission of detailed tax returns involves significant compliance costs (administrative 
burden) for taxpayers as well as the tax authorities. In countries with low levels of self-employment and 
undeclared work, low-paid and less-educated workers will typically prefer an employee status to 
self-employment partly because tax compliance is much simpler in the former case. This approach 
minimises tax compliance costs in the economy as a whole. Effective tax systems therefore promote a 
long-term transition towards a salaried economy, where the remaining self-employed are mainly in two 
categories: employers, who have relatively high earnings and handle the bulk of the paperwork for their 
employees as well as themselves; and other self-employed who, by the nature of their business, need to 
work for different employers or customers throughout the year and thus cannot easily work as employees. 
In Korea (probably related to the shortage of regular employee jobs), the proportion of workers who are 
self-employed has scarcely fallen since 1997 (Table 2.2), but it is likely to fall as part of any strategy for 
ensuring high rates of tax compliance by the self-employed. 
169. One type of informal employment is so-called “false self-employment”, when a relationship 
which is in fact dependent employment is declared as a purchase of services from a self-employed person. 
In Korea, as firms increase outsourcing to self-employed workers in certain industries, the issue of how to 
protect these workers in labour laws and social insurance has been debated for a long time without a 
conclusion. Other OECD countries seem to apply two policies in this area: a) they align tax treatments so 
that there is in principle no tax advantage to self-employed status, although the self-employed may in 
practice have greater opportunities for evasion; and b) on the basis of several criteria used in combination, 
they determine whether particular situations are legally permitted to be interpreted as self-employment, 
rather than an employer-employee relationship. 
Documentation of labour inputs by a labour or social security inspectorate 
170. In many OECD countries and other middle-income countries, a labour inspectorate or social 
security inspectorate plays a central role in detecting undeclared work through site visits to workplaces. 
                                                          
60. Korea for some years had tax incentives for consumers to use credit cards for purchases, in order to 
improve the reporting of transactions at the end-point of the VAT chain. The total of 1 million individuals 
paying VAT based on book-keeping reports in 2004 represents fairly rapid progress; Song (2002) cites 
461 000 book-keeping taxpayers in 1996 and 680 000 in 2000. 
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For example, employers may be required to keep a register at the worksite where all employees at the 
worksite are listed. Random worksite inspections can then verify that workers who are present at the 
worksite are in fact being included in the register. 
171. Worksite inspections can only directly detect the presence of workers at a worksite, not their 
earnings, and they can only with difficulty detect hours worked, which is necessary to ensure that taxes are 
paid on all hours that are worked.
61
 To limit under-declaration of earnings, the tax authorities need to 
assume that work is full-time and permanent in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary. 
Over-reliance on the direct detection of labour inputs as the basis for taxation tends to lead to strict 
regulation of employment, in conjunction with private sector practices that conceal labour inputs so far as 
possible. These factors tend to depress the economy’s aggregate employment rate, particularly as measured 
in terms of formal employment. 
172. To avoid over-reliance on the direct detection of labour inputs, tax rates on labour (often mainly 
social security contributions) should be kept lower than tax rates on distributed profits in order to reinforce 
the tax incentive for employers to declare their employees described in Box 4.7. When undeclared work is 
detected, the authorities should not use the information only to collect unpaid contributions and a fine; they 
should also take this as evidence of under-reporting of sales or failure to keep books. This is an important 
reason why integration, or at least close cooperation, between the social security and income tax 
administrations is an efficient arrangement. 
Detection of undeclared work through unemployment benefit administration 
173. Unemployment benefit entitlements are targeted on groups that are likely to be working – those 
who have a good employment record over recent months and years in the case of insurance benefits, and 
adults with no other family income in the case of assistance benefits. The payment of unemployment 
benefits reduces workers’ need for low-paid undeclared work, and helps the PES to make labour available 
to employers who have job vacancies in the formal sector. 
174. At the same time, some unemployed workers will seek to engage in undeclared work while 
drawing unemployment benefits. PES offices, through contacts with local employers and regular 
face-to-face meetings with the unemployed, are well-placed to detect undeclared work. Unemployment 
benefit administrations have a financial incentive to detect low-paid undeclared work and can exploit 
public sentiment against benefit fraud (which is stronger than public sentiment against undeclared work) in 
order to achieve this. In this way, unemployment benefit administrations may be the most effective actors 
in suppressing undeclared work at the lower end of the labour market where income tax authorities have 
lesser incentive. In some OECD countries (such as Australia and the United Kingdom, which have a 
nationally-financed indefinite-duration unemployment assistance benefit), much of the fieldwork to detect 
undeclared work seems to be done by unemployment benefit fraud units.
62
 
                                                          
61. As described in OECD (2004c, Chapter 5), in Belgium employers must either give part-time workers a 
contract that specifies their hours of work, or publicly display a rota at the workplace which says when 
part-time workers will be present. Devices such as these are needed to allow the inspectorate to detect 
situations where a worker with a part-time contract is in fact working full-time. 
62. Hur (2001 and 2005) analyses relationships between unemployment insurance and informal employment. 
He suggests, for example, that extending the coverage of UI can help bring parts of the informal sector into 
the formal sector, and that spending to improve the administrative capacity of social insurance 
administrations, to support compliance monitoring as coverage expands, can yield budgetary savings in the 
medium- and long-term perspective. 
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Daily workers and Korea’s e-card system for construction site workers 
175. In the Public Health scheme and National Pension scheme, daily workers are allowed to continue 
in the regional-based schemes instead of the workplace-based scheme. In case of the EIS, which does not 
have such a regional-based scheme, daily workers began to be covered in 2004; 528 000 workers were 
insured by December 2004 and 722 000 by December 2005 (Jang, 2007). Outside the construction sector, 
as from 2006, the mandatory submission by employers of tax returns concerning their daily workers is 
expected to have had a positive effect on their social security coverage. 
176. Chain subcontracting is prevalent in the construction industry in many OECD countries. At the 
bottom of the chain, recipients may be declared as self-employed and then escape taxation on earnings 
through disappearance, or very small enterprises may disappear without handing money from tax 
withholding over to the tax authority. Furthermore, subcontractors can evade taxes and social security 
contributions by over-reporting material costs and under-reporting their wage costs (OECD, 2004c, 
Chapter 5). In Korean construction sites, there is a longstanding practice of subcontracting work to a team 
leader, called a ship-jang, who brings his team of workers to the construction site, without the workers in 
his team being identified. Only the global payment to the ship-jang is recorded. The construction workers 
are classified as daily workers, since they do not work for a long time at the same construction site. As a 
result, accounting books on construction sites do not provide reliable wage records.  
177. Even the plan announced in November 2005 for coverage of daily workers excludes ship-jang 
work at most construction sites: social security schemes for daily workers in construction sites will be kept 
as they are. However, the Ministry of Labor in 2004 initiated a pilot e-card reporting system for 
construction daily workers, which is currently implemented in 700 relatively large construction sites. The 
e-card allows attendance at construction sites to be reported and managed in real time. Total wages paid to 
each daily worker are calculated from his/her days worked, which is reported electronically, and his/her 
daily wages, which must be reported when the e-card is issued. 
4.5. Policy recommendations 
178. This report has analysed various factors behind the growth of temporary employment in Korea, 
including demographic change, expanding service industries and companies’ externalisation strategies. The 
latter were shown to have been reinforced by EPL mechanisms, wage-setting practices and 
labour/management relations, all becoming more important in the aftermath of the 1997/98 financial crisis. 
Korea’s labour market evolution since then can illustrate the emphasis of the recent reassessment of the 
OECD Jobs Strategy on interactions between adverse macroeconomic shocks (like the financial crisis) and 
structural policy settings and institutions (OECD, 2006, Chapter 6). One distinguishing feature of Korea is 
that this interaction has given rise to increased labour market duality. 
179. Thus, remedies against labour market duality go beyond issues in the labour market itself and 
need to tackle the interactions between labour and product markets. Large companies dominating product 
markets, along with significant bargaining power of regular workers, may have reinforced insider-outsider 
effects. In turn, these companies have tended to reduce hiring of regular workers, resorted to “honorary 
retirement” of a large number of existing workers and attempted to reduce labour costs and/or increase 
workforce flexibility by hiring under temporary contracts and outsourcing certain production processes. 
Subcontracted companies have also tended to rely on non-permanent staff to reduce their own labour costs 
when faced with cost-cutting pressures from their chief contractors. Therefore, policies to address labour 
market duality in Korea would benefit from more competitive product markets which would weaken 
insider-outsider effects – along with a stable macroeconomic environment that can produce business 
confidence. 
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180. Labour market reforms also have a critical role to play in reducing labour market duality while 
maintaining the strong job creation record of Korea. The discussion above has shown that labour market 
institutions and policies need to concentrate their reform efforts on ensuring more stability in employment 
relationships, reducing insider/outsider cleavages, and combating undeclared forms of employment. These 
policies need to tackle the areas of employment protection regulation, severance pay practices, anti-
discrimination legislation, minimum wages, coverage of the social safety net, compliance with social security 
schemes and training programmes. Wage determination structures, as well as trust and consensus-building 
between labour and management, constitute other important issues where the government may have less 
immediate leverage, but needs to give a strong impetus for reform. 
181. The above should not be taken to imply that there have been no reforms in the Korean labour 
market in recent years. On the contrary, the Korean government has already undertaken many important 
reforms in labour market regulation. In the coming years, after the passing of the bills on non-regular 
employment and of the Roadmap for industrial relations reform, the five-year comprehensive plan for 
non-regular employment is on the agenda. 
182.  Based on the discussion in the main body of this report, some of the recommendations of the 
restated OECD Jobs Strategy – in particular, Pillars B and C on impediments to labour market participation 
and labour demand – seem especially relevant to Korea. Indeed, many of the policy proposals below show 
how the Jobs Strategy could be used in the Korean reform process. Other proposals are more specific to the 
Korean context. 
A. Pursue reforms in employment protection legislation so as to achieve greater balance in the 
treatment of regular versus non-regular forms of employment 
 Continue to ease the strictness of EPL for regular contracts, thus making the hiring of permanent 
workers more attractive, while also better protecting non-regular workers; reinforce mechanisms 
for the speedy resolution of dismissal disputes; 
 Strengthen the incentives for workers and employers – for example, through preferential taxation 
– to convert the existing severance pay system (retirement allowance) to a corporate pension 
scheme (preferably one based on defined contributions), and expand eligibility to the scheme to 
employees with less than one-year tenure, in order to reduce the existing labour cost differentials 
between permanent and temporary workers. 
B. Combat discriminatory wage differentials between regular and non-regular employees 
 Combat discriminatory practices related to wages, employee welfare benefits and other terms and 
conditions of temporary or non-regular workers by implementing anti-discrimination legislation; 
 Set minimum wages at levels that tackle excessively low wages or under-declaration of earnings, 
but do not exceed the true productivity of low-wage workers, while using other anti-poverty 
programmes for appropriate income redistribution; 
C. Modernise the seniority-based wage and mandatory retirement systems 
 Encourage the social partners to modernise the existing seniority-based wage system, which 
makes older workers relatively expensive, with a view to transforming it into a remuneration 
system more closely linked to performance and productivity. Promote labour-management 
dialogue on the subject and monitor closely the impact of the wage-peak system; 
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 Encourage firms to raise their company-specific mandatory retirement age towards official 
retirement ages;  
D. Improve employment prospects of non-regular workers and disadvantaged employees 
 Remove obstacles faced by women in the labour market by introducing more family-friendly 
policies, such as increasing child-care support and ensuring that part-time work is not at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis full-time work; 
 Promote equal access to training programmes for non-regular and disadvantaged employees. To 
this end, strengthen financial incentives for i) employers to provide training opportunities to 
non-regular workers, and for ii) individual workers to engage in continuing training, for example 
through the planned skill development card scheme. 
E. Increase employability and income security of temporary or non-regular employees by 
enhancing employment services and expanding the social safety net 
 Continue on-going reform of the public employment service, including improvement of 
staff/client ratios. Expand the PES market share in the service sector; facilitate access to the 
service by temporary/non-regular employees and improve job matching for this clientele; 
 Use personal follow-up, intensive interview techniques and individual action plans for effective 
activation of unemployment beneficiaries, combined with moderate benefit sanctions, if necessary; 
 Improve links with private employment agencies and base contracting-out arrangements as far as 
possible on provider outcomes; 
F. Promote further transition towards a salaried economy 
 Expand the workplace-based coverage of employees by social insurance systems. Increase 
compliance by unifying the collection of social security contributions. 
 Motivate employers to report wage and salaries, by promoting book-keeping and auditing the 
accounts of small employers, and by implementing the requirement for all employers to report 
the wage payments they make to daily workers; 
 Require all workers to submit an annual income-tax return. Enhance co-operation between social 
insurance administrations and the tax authority; 
 Monitor the effectiveness of the pilot e-card report system for daily workers in large construction 
sites, and consider expanding the use of the resulting employment records for calculating wages; 
 Reinforce PES efforts to detect undeclared work by people on unemployment benefit and to help 
employers recruit workers for similar declared jobs, which tend to be more stable. 
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ANNEX 1 
 
DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF NON-REGULAR WORKERS IN KOREA 
183. The term non-regular worker – rather than temporary worker – is widely used in Korean 
economic literature, among policy makers, and within the media. The term tends to be used for all workers 
who are not regular workers, irrespective of employment duration. Nevertheless, a full consensus on the 
definition among scholars is still lacking, and the term non-regular worker (or sometimes non-standard 
worker) may refer to different definitions. 
184. Two surveys implemented by the National Statistical Office (NSO) can be used for analysis on 
non-regular employment; the Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS) which collects monthly data 
on employment status; and the annual Supplement to the EAPS which was designed to collect more 
detailed information on various employment types. A third data set often used for the analysis of 
non-regular employment is the Korea Labour and Income Panel Survey (KLIPS) undertaken by the Korea 
Labour Institute (KLI). 
Four different definitions on non-regular workers are used in Korean economic literature. 
185. Definition A relies on data on employment status collected by the EAPS since 1989. This 
definition categorises wage and salary workers into regular employees, temporary employees and daily 
workers. Regular employees are defined as those who work more than one year at a firm and are paid 
standard wages, plus bonuses and overtime. Using a residual approach, the NSO defines all other 
employees as non-regular and divides them into temporary employees and daily workers by the length of 
their respective employment relationship. This approach has drawbacks when trying to analyse the data in 
terms of labour market duality and precarious employment. The criteria for distinction – such as whether 
specific benefits are paid or not – may not be suitable for the measurement of precarity, since many 
workers (including permanent ones) in small firms are not paid such benefits. Therefore, data on temporary 
employees collected by the EAPS rather illustrate disadvantaged forms of employment, but not, strictly 
speaking, precarious employment. 
186. Definition B relies on data collected by the EAPS Supplement since 2000. In this supplement, the 
questionnaire was designed to define a number of specific employment types. Workers who have a 
fixed-term contract or expect limited duration of the work arrangement for involuntary reasons are defined 
as contingent workers.
63
 The EAPS Supplement also collects data on part-time workers and atypical 
workers. The latter category includes temporary agency workers, individual contract workers, at-home 
workers, on-call workers and other new forms of employment (i.e. a grey sector located at the margin 
between wage earner and self-employed). The Korean economic literature using the supplementary data set 
tends to define non-regular employment as the sum of contingent workers, part-time workers and atypical 
workers, although slight differences in detailed definition have not been resolved among scholars. The 
                                                          
63. The reason for such a definition based on the actual or expected duration is that there is no universal 
practice of signing a written employment contract in Korea. 
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Ministry of Labor also uses this definition for calculating the size of non-regular employment, based on a 
2002 agreement on the use of statistics for non-regular workers in the Korean Tripartite Commission. 
187. Data from the EAPS and from the EAPS Supplement can be matched category by category since 
the two data sets are collected at the same time, from the same sample households. Table A.1 compares 
classification results using the two definitions in the form of a matrix. Non-regular workers under 
definition A are the sum of sectors II and III, while under definition B non-regular workers are the sum of 
sectors I and II. Sector I represents workers with fixed-term contracts of over one-year duration. 
Meanwhile, sector III tends to include workers in quasi-permanent jobs. This is because the latter are 
categorised as temporary employees and daily workers by the EAPS since they are not paid specific 
benefits. However, they are not classified as non-regular workers by the EAPS Supplement since they are 
neither contingent, part-time, nor atypical. 
Table A.1. Classification of non-regular workers by the EAPS and its supplement, 2005 
Number of workers in thousands, and in percent 
 
Definition B: status in the EAPS Supplement (where workers who are not 
contingent, part-time or atypical are “regular”) 
Non-regular workers Regular workers Total 
Contingent Part-time Atypical 
Definition A: 
status in the 
EAPS (where 
workers with 
tenure over a year 
and paid bonuses 
and overtime are 
“regular”) 
Regular 
employees 
I 
1 512 
(10.1%) 
IV 
6 414 
(42.9%) 
 
7 926 
(53.0%) 
Temporary 
employees 
and  
daily 
workers 
II  
3 970 
(26.5%) 
III 
3 073 
(20.5%) 
 
7 043 
(47.0%) 
Total 
5 483 
(36.6%) 
9 483 
(63.4%) 
14 969 
(42.9%) 
Source: EAPS and EAPS Supplement, August 2005, as reported by the Ministry of Labor, Korea. 
188. Table A.1 shows that almost half of temporary employees and daily workers under definition A 
are not classified as non-regular workers under definition B. Some researchers argue that workers listed 
under sector III in the table represent workers who work under less favourable working conditions in small 
firms, calling them disadvantaged or seemingly-discriminated workers (Ahn, 2004; and Hwang, 2003). This 
view is supported by the fact that most workers in sector III work at very small firms. Table A.2 shows that 
about 85% of workers in sector III (the seemingly discriminated workers) work at small firms with less than 
30 employees, and over 40% of them work at very small workplaces with less than five workers. Thus, any 
results on non-regular employment based on definition A tend to be biased by including permanent or 
quasi-permanent workers in small firms. 
189. Definition C argues that workers in sector III of Table A.1 should be included in the definition of 
non-regular employment simply because data on temporary employees and daily workers collected by the 
EAPS should not be excluded from the definition of non-regular employment. Supporters of this definition 
do not believe in the reliability of data on establishment size used in Table A.2, and argue that sector III may 
represent workers who are discriminated against as temporary workers in workplaces irrespective of their 
employment contract (Kim, 2001 and 2005). According to this definition, non-regular employment 
corresponds to the sum of sectors I, II and III from Table A.1. This definition is supported by the Korean 
trade unions. 
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Table A.2. Share of non-regular workers by employment type and establishment size, 2003
a
 
Percentages 
 
Firm size (number of workers) 
Total 1-4 5-9 10-29 30-299 300 and over 
Wage earners 100.0 
(100.0) 
100.0 
(20.1) 
100.0 
(16.4) 
100.0 
(21.9) 
100.0 
(19.4) 
100.0 
(22.3) 
Official standard workers 70.1 
(100.0) 
50.5 
(15.1) 
60.4 
(14.7) 
66.3 
(21.6) 
72.4 
(17.5) 
83.4 
(27.7) 
Standard workers 41.6 
(100.0) 
5.7 
(2.6) 
27.2 
(10.0) 
44.8 
(22.0) 
60.8 
(26.4) 
77.9 
(39.0) 
Seemingly-discriminated workers 28.5 
(100.0) 
44.7 
(39.7) 
33.3 
(24.1) 
21.4 
(20.7) 
11.6 
(9.9) 
5.5 
(5.4) 
Official non-standard workers 29.9 
(100.0) 
49.5 
(30.2) 
39.5 
(19.7) 
33.7 
(22.5) 
27.6 
(16.3) 
16.6 
(11.3) 
Contingent workers 9.5 
(100.0) 
21.4 
(26.1) 
20.2 
(20.2) 
17.1 
(22.8) 
13.8 
(16.3) 
10.7 
(14.6) 
Alternative workers 20.4 
(100.0) 
28.1 
(34.3) 
19.3 
(19.2) 
16.6 
(22.1) 
13.8 
(16.3) 
5.9 
(8.0) 
a) Items in this table correspond to each sector in Table A.1. The item Standard workers corresponds to sector IV; the item 
Seemingly-discriminated workers corresponds to sector III, and the item Official non-standard workers corresponds to the sum of 
sectors I and II. 
Source: Cited from Ahn (2004), based on the August 2003 EAPS Supplement. 
190. Definition D is related to the Korea Labor and Income Panel Survey. The KLIPS definition 
includes, first, temporary and daily workers who are defined by contract duration – i.e. temporary workers 
are defined as workers with a fixed-term contract longer than one month and shorter than one year, and 
daily workers are defined as on-call workers and workers with contracts of below one month’s duration. In 
addition, the definition includes those that declare themselves to be non-regular workers. 
There has been a contradictory trend between the number of non-regular workers as reported by the EAPS, 
and the extent of temporary employment as reported by the EAPS Supplement. 
191. The share of temporary employees and daily workers collected by the EAPS – i.e. non-regular 
workers as under definition A – declined from 52.1% in 2000 to 47.9% in 2005 (see Table 2.2), while the 
share of temporary workers – who are the largest category of non-regular employment under definition B – 
has increased significantly during the same period (see Table 2.4). What could explain this contradictory 
trend? 
192. Table A.3 shows how the proportions of single categories in a matrix composed of employment 
status data from the EAPS and employment type data from the EAPS Supplement have changed between 
2001 and 2005. The most significant changes are the decrease in the cell corresponding to sector III of 
Table A.1, i.e. workers who are permanent according to Definition B but temporary employees and daily 
workers according Definition A (these are the seemingly discriminated workers); and the increase in the 
cell corresponding to sector I of Table A.1, i.e. workers who are temporary according to Definition B but 
are regular according to Definition A. The decrease in the number of sector III (seemingly discriminated) 
workers might be related to the decline of employment in Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and 
hotels 27.2% in 2000 to 26.0% in 2004. The increase in the number of sector I workers indicates that 
temporary employees increasingly have tenure of over a year and are paid bonuses and overtime. 
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Table A.3. Changes in the incidence of temporary or non-regular employment by different definitions 
Number of workers in thousands, and in percent 
 Employment type by EAPS Supplement 
(definition B) 
Permanent Temporary Total 
Employment 
status by 
EAPS 
(definition A) 
2001 
Regular employees 
6 923 
(46.5%) 
413 
(3.1%) 
6 706 
(49.5%) 
Temporary employees 
and daily workers 
5 087 
(37.6%) 
1 747 
(12.9%) 
6 834 
(50.5%) 
Total 
11 380 
(84.0%) 
2 176 
(16.0%) 
13 540 
(100.0%) 
2005 
Regular employees 
6 546 
(43.7%) 
1 379 
(9.2%) 
7 925 
(52.9%) 
Temporary employees 
and daily workers 
4 026 
(26.9%) 
3 017 
(20.2%) 
7 043 
(47.1%) 
Total 
10 572 
(70.6%) 
4 396 
(29.4%) 
14 968 
(100.0%) 
Source: Ministry of Labor, replies to an OECD questionnaire, January 2006. 
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